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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
Ministerial advisers are now an accepted part of the advisory arrangements of the 
executive in Australia, helping ministers discharge their political, policy and media 
functions. Yet this important role has received less attention than those of ministers 
and the bureaucracy.  By looking at the way policy advisers behaved in the Rudd 
government, this paper seeks to add to knowledge about a group of people who 
work at the heart of political and policy processes in modern government.   
 
Although a Code of Conduct for Ministerial Staff was introduced in July 2008, 
advisers still work with few guidelines on their roles and responsibilities.  Their work 
is conducted behind the scenes, with their contributions usually not evident in 
documentary records.1  The hidden nature of their work, combined with their location 
in the core executive, able to exert influence over ministers, creates suspicion about 
the way they discharge their duties.  The involvement of advisers in political 
controversies has added to concern about their roles, power and accountability.   
 
The research behind this paper attempted to discover how advisers behave when 
undertaking policy work.  Some scholarship on accountability suggests advisers are 
out of control,2 acting as they please, often to advance highly political agendas.  At 
the most extreme end, reacting to the findings of the 2001 children overboard affair, 
Weller famously said ‘some advisers have become “the junk-yard attack dogs” of the 
political system: the hard men and the hit men’.3  While controversies involving 
advisers raise legitimate questions about accountability, this paper argues that 
focussing on those extreme events obscures the day-to-day work of advisers, 
creating an unbalanced and inaccurate picture.   
 
                                                   
1
  Maley, M, (2010), ‘Chapter 3 – Australia’, in Eichbaum, C and Shaw, R, eds, (2010), Partisan 
Appointees and Public Servants: An International Analysis of the Role of the Political Adviser, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, pp 105 and 107.   
2
  Tiernan (2004), Ministerial Staff Under the Howard Government: Problem, Solution or Black 
Hole?, Unpublished PhD Thesis: Department of Politics and Public Policy, Griffith University, 
p 25. 
3
  Weller, P, (2002), Don’t Tell the Prime Minister, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, p 72.  See 
appendix 2 for an account of the children overboard affair.   
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Part of the inaccuracy arises from the near absence of ministers in some of those 
accounts, their influence rendered virtually non-existent.  Given Maley found 
ministers exerted a ‘defining power’ over their advisers’ policy roles in her study of 
the Keating government, this is a serious deficiency.4  In framing the question for this 
research, it seemed reasonable to assume ministers’ power could extend to 
influencing their advisers’ behaviour.  It also seemed reasonable to assume that 
ministers, wanting to avoid unnecessary and time-consuming controversies, would 
seek to control that behaviour, set standards and make sure advisers understand the 
limits to their delegated authority.   
 
Those assumptions were investigated through interviews with former Rudd 
government ministers and their advisers, testing a hypothesis that advisers’ 
behaviour is largely determined by their minister.  The research examined how 
ministers exerted influence and how advisers reacted.  The paper considers whether 
advisers continue to act as agents of their minister – the traditional view – or whether 
they act more independently, as the Senate inquiry into the children overboard affair 
found.5  To determine the effect of other factors that might play a part, advisers’ 
personal conceptions, the effect of their interactions with the public service, and the 
influence of the Code of Conduct were also investigated.   
 
The investigations found that ministers do exert a dominant, defining influence over 
the behaviour of their advisers.  They do this by establishing standards and an office 
culture, and through the parameters of their delegation to advisers.  Ministers also 
exert an indirect influence as advisers react to their preferences, values and ways of 
working.  It was clear that advisers continue to act as agents of their ministers, 
subordinating their preferences and views to those of their minister.  Unrelated to 
ministers, advisers’ personal conceptions of professionalism and integrity, and their 
interactions with the public service, also played a part.  Most advisers said the 2008 
                                                   
4
  Maley, M, (2002b), Partisans as the Centre of Government: The Role of Ministerial Advisers 
in the Keating Government 1991-96, Unpublished PhD thesis, Canberra: School of Social 
Sciences, Australian National University, p 102; see also Eichbaum and Shaw (2006), ‘Enemy 
or Ally? Senior Officials’ Perceptions of Ministerial Advisers Before and After MMP’, Political 
Science, 2006 58: 33-22, at p 15. 
5
  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, (2002), Report, October, Parliament 
of Australia, Canberra.   
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Code of Conduct had no influence as they were already meeting its standards, but 
most also supported its introduction.  The findings showed a system of checks and 
balances on adviser behaviour.  Most chiefs of staff supervised advisers, helping to 
enforce ministerial standards and expectations.  Advisers knew poor behaviour could 
not be hidden from chiefs of staff, ministers and the prime minister’s office.  The 
judgements they made while acting as the agent of their minister were also 
constantly tested when they reported back to their ministers, through public service 
briefing, and as ministers made decisions that could affirm or reject those 
judgements.  The precarious nature of advisers’ employment was another check.  
The data also revealed the overwhelming presence of a ‘professional adviser’ type.  
That type was one of the four identified by Maley in her study, but then they were in 
the minority.6     
 
This study seeks present a fuller, more nuanced picture of adviser behaviour and to 
illuminate the constraints that shape that behaviour as advisers carry out policy work.  
While the paper does not argue those constraints mean demands for greater 
accountability of advisers have necessarily been satisfied, its findings support 
Maley’s argument that reasserting the agency relationship between advisers and 
ministers is the best path toward stronger accountability.7  A more detailed 
examination of adviser behaviour is important to properly inform the accountability 
debate.  The findings should also add to the general understanding of a relatively 
new role, particularly as one of the first studies of the Rudd government.   
 
  
                                                   
6
  Maley, (2002b), op cit, pp 296-300. 
7
  Maley, (2003), Submission to the Senate Finance and Public Administration References 
Committee Inquiry Into Staff Employed Under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=fapa_ct
te/completed_inquiries/2002-04/mops/submissions/sublist.htm, p 2. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature review and methodology 
 
1. Literature Review 
 
Scholarly work on ministerial advisers in Westminster governments broadly covers 
one theme: how an ‘institutional innovation’8 fits within the Westminster system.  
Early research considered whether a new role was emerging and becoming 
institutionalised. Work continues on the roles and relationships created by the rise of 
advisers, the influence they have, and their impact on the bureaucracy.  Some 
studies look at the forces that have fuelled ministers’ increasing reliance on advisers, 
and there is considerable agreement in their findings.  However, there is ongoing 
debate about whether advisers can legitimately operate within a Westminster-style 
executive, with its exclusive relationship, in theory at least, between ministers and 
bureaucrats.  With advisers occupying an influential position, a strand of the 
literature considers how they are held to account.  There is debate about whether 
they are independent actors or agents of their minister and therefore accountable 
through them.  Data come mostly from surveys and interviews, although evidence 
generated by Australian Senate inquiries and other reports about controversies 
involving advisers, particularly the children overboard affair, informs the 
accountability debate.9  However, those sources, with their focus on improper 
conduct, have skewed understanding of how advisers behave in their daily work – 
something this study seeks to help remedy.   
 
(a) Advisers’ roles and impact on the public sector 
 
Advisers in Australia began to undertake policy work under the Whitlam 
government.10  Since the mid-1980s, research has considered whether this role has 
                                                   
8
  Maley (2011), ‘Strategic Links in a Cut-throat World: Rethinking the Role and Relationships of 
Australian Ministerial Staff’, Public Administration, Volume 89, Issue 4, 1469–1488 at p 1468. 
9
  Others include the Senate Select Committee on Matters Arising from Pay Television 
Tendering Process, First Report, September 1993, the Australian National Audit Office’s 
Community Cultural, Recreational and Sporting Facilities Program, Audit Report No. 34, 
1990-91 (the ‘Sports Rorts’ controversy), and its Ministerial Travel Claims, Audit Report No. 
23, 1997-98 (the ‘Travel Rorts’ controversy); Tiernan (2004), op cit, pp 275 and 291.   
10
  Smith (1976), ‘Appendix 1.J: Ministerial Advisers’, in the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration Report Appendix Volume One, Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, pp 291-292.  The Whitlam government was the first in Australia to use 
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become permanent.  Walter’s comprehensive comparative study of the Whitlam, 
Fraser and Hawke governments found ‘manifestations of institutionalization’ 
beginning under Hawke,11 with advisers’ roles expanding and consolidating under 
Hawke and Keating.12  Advisers are now considered an inevitable part of 
Westminster governments around the world, influential within the executive.13   
 
With advisers becoming ‘more central ... within the policy process’,14 studies have 
examined their roles, with considerable commonality evident across different parties 
and governments.15  In those studies, advisers from the Hawke government onward 
nominated policy work as their most important role, followed by liaison with the 
bureaucracy.16  Roles expanded over time, with oversight of implementation and 
policy negotiation becoming more important.17   
                                                                                                                                                              
ministerial advisers in the form they operate in today, that is, being involved in policy-making 
as well as liaising with the bureaucracy and undertaking administrative tasks.  Before this, 
ministers usually had a press secretary and a small number of public servants facilitating the 
flow of paper from their departments; ibid, p 292. 
11
  Walter (1986), The Ministers’ Minders: Personal Advisers in National Government, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, p 120. 
12
  Dunn (1995), ‘Ministerial Staff in Australian Commonwealth Government’, Australian Journal 
of Public Administration, 54,  507-519; Ryan (1995), ‘Ministerial Advisers and Policy-making’, 
in From Hawke to Keating: Australian Commonwealth Administration 1990-1993, ed Stewart, 
J, Canberra: Centre for Research in Public Sector Management, University of Canberra and 
RIPAA, pp 141-161; Maley (2002b), op cit; Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 89. 
13
  Walter (1986), op cit, p 5; Ryan, op cit, p 147; Maley (2000), ‘Conceptualising Advisers' Policy 
Work: The Distinctive Policy Roles of Ministerial Advisers in the Keating government, 1991-
96’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol 35, Issue 3, 449-470, p 454; Tiernan, 2004, op 
cit, pp 2 and 3; Anderson (2006), ‘Ministerial Staff: New Players in the Policy Game’, in ed 
Colebatch, H. K, Beyond the Policy Cycle: The Policy Process in Australia, 166-183, pp 169 
and 172; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007a), ‘Ministerial Advisers, Politicization and the Retreat 
from Westminster: The Case of New Zealand’, Public Administration, 85(3), 609-640, p 615; 
Connaughton (2010), ‘‘Glorified Gofers, Policy Experts or Good Generalists’: A Classification 
of the Roles of the Irish Ministerial Adviser’, Irish Political Studies, 25: 3, 347-369, p 347; 
Maley (2011), op cit, p 1469; Eichbaum and Shaw (2011), ‘Political Staff in Executive 
Government: Conceptualising and Mapping Roles within the Core Executive’, Australian 
Journal of Political Science, 46:4, 583-600, p 598. 
14
  Anderson, op cit, p174; also Eichbaum and Shaw (2006), op cit, p 11.   
15
  Smith, op cit; Forward (1977), ‘Ministerial Staff under Whitlam and Fraser’, Australian Journal 
of Public Administration, 56(2), pp 159-167, p 164; Walter (1986), op cit; Dunn (1995), op cit; 
Dunn (1997), Politics and Administration at the Top: Lessons from Down Under, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh; Ryan op cit; Maley (2002b), op cit; Tiernan (2004), op cit; 
Anderson, op cit; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007a), op cit; Connaughton, op cit, Maley (2011), op 
cit; Eichbaum and Shaw (2011), op cit.   
16
  Walter (1986), op cit, p 133; Dunn (1995), op cit, p 509; Dunn (1997), op cit, p 78, Maley, 
(2000), op cit, p 454; Maley (2002b), op cit, p 94. 
17
  Dunn (1995), op cit, pp 514-515; Ryan, op cit; Maley (2000), op cit; Maley (2002b), op cit, pp 
99-120; Connaughton, op cit; Eichbaum and Shaw (2011), op cit. 
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In the literature, advisers are traditionally considered agents of their ministers.18  
However, they can sometimes wield considerable policy influence themselves,19 and 
this leads to the debate over whether their roles complement or conflict with those of 
the bureaucracy.  Many studies conclude that advisers have different responsibilities 
from bureaucrats.20  However, advisers are also said to intrude on the ‘bilateral 
monopoly’ between ministers and the public service,21 with confusion and tension 
over roles and responsibilities.22  Tiernan says the policy influence of advisers comes 
at the expense of the bureaucracy,23 but Maley disputes this.24  Echoing earlier 
work,25 Maley found advisers’ influence and roles highly contingent, shaped by their 
minister’s power, seniority and portfolio, the extent of ministerial delegation, and 
advisers’ skills, experience and personal conceptions of their role.26  She also found 
ministers thought the robust engagement between advisers and public servants 
produced stronger policy advice.27   
 
                                                   
18
  Smith, op cit, p 301; Walter (1986), op cit, p 1; Ryan, op cit, p 155; Maley (2000), op cit, p 
469; Maley (2002b), op cit, p 64; Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 38; Tiernan (2005), Minding the 
Minders: Addressing the Problem of Ministerial Staff, Paper to the Australasian Political 
Studies Association Conference, Otago University, 28-30 September, pp 4 and 38; Fawcett 
and Gay (2010), ‘The United Kingdom’, in Eichbaum, C and Shaw, R, eds, Partisan 
Appointees and Public Servants: An International Analysis of the Role of the Political Adviser, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, p 30; Eichbaum and Shaw (2011), op cit, p 595. 
19
  Walter (1986),op cit, p 152; Dunn (1995), p 512; Ryan, op cit, p 155; Maley (2000), op cit, p 
455; Maley (2002b), op cit, p 166; Anderson, op cit, pp 173-175; Maley (2010), op cit, pp 100 
and 108-109; Maley (2011), op cit, pp 1484 and 1486; Eichbaum and Shaw (2011), op cit, p 
584. 
20
  Dunn (1995), op cit, p 513; Dunn (1997), op cit, p 87; Rudd (1992), ‘The Role of Ministerial 
Advisers in the Public Policy Process’, in Decision Making in Queensland Government, eds, 
Nethercote, J and Galligan, B, and Walsh, C. Canberra, Federalism Research Centre, pp 91-
92; Holloway (1996), ‘Departments and Ministerial Offices: An Essential partnership’, in The 
House on Capital Hill: Parliament, Politics and Power in the National Capital, eds Disney, J 
and Nethercote, J, Sydney: Federation Press, pp 133-136; Fitzgerald (1996), ‘Advice on 
Public Policy: The Changing Balance Between the Public Service and Political Advisers’, The 
House on Capital Hill: Parliament, Politics and Power in the National Capital, eds Disney, J 
and Nethercote, J, Sydney: Federation Press, p 130; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007b), op cit, p 
463; Maley (2010), op cit, p 106. 
21
  Smith, op cit, p 303; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007a), op cit, p 615; Fawcett and Gay, op cit, p 
37-38. 
22
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 25.     
23
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 72. 
24
  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 275. 
25
  Walter (1986), op cit, pp 141, 142, 143 and 154; Dunn (1995), op cit, p 512; see also 
Connaughton, op cit, p 351; Ryan, op cit, p 147. 
26
  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 99; see also Eichbaum and Shaw (2006), op cit, p 15. 
27
  Maley (2002b), op cit, pp 274-275. 
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Another debate concerns whether advisers protect the bureaucracy from 
politicisation when they undertake overtly political tasks,28  or politicise public 
servants by encouraging them to move from neutral independence to greater 
responsiveness.29  Tiernan says advisers under the Howard government were 
increasingly aggressive in their attempts to increase bureaucratic responsiveness.30  
However, Eichbaum and Shaw’s survey of senior public servants in New Zealand 
finds little fear of politicisation, and participants acknowledged they had responsibility 
to protect themselves.31  The majority of respondents in a recent Australian Public 
Service survey also reported no difficulty balancing responsiveness with the need to 
be apolitical.32   
 
Although advisers help ministers exercise control over the bureaucracy, many 
studies find the relationship between advisers and bureaucrats works reasonably 
well.33 Some studies show senior public servants mostly think advisers contribute 
positively to policy processes.34  Others show bureaucrats using advisers’ knowledge 
and skills, testing policy ideas on them and relying on their political and media 
expertise.35  An opposing argument says advisers and bureaucrats compete,36 with 
advisers reducing public service capacity.37  Maley sees the adviser-bureaucrat 
                                                   
28
  Smith, op cit, pp 293 and 304; Dunn (1995), op cit, p 513 and 517; Walter (2006), ‘Ministers, 
Minders and Public Servants: Changing Parameters of Responsibility in Australia’, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, 65(3), 22-27, p 22; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007b), op cit, p 
459; Maley (2010), op cit, p 101. 
29
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, pp 25 and 33-34; Eichbaum and Shaw (2010), op cit, p 5; Maley 
(2010), op cit, p 106.   
30
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, pp 25 and 33-34. 
31
  Eichbaum and Shaw (2006), op cit, p 17; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007a), op cit, p 635. 
32
  The latest State of the Service report from the Australian Public Service Commissioner found 
65 per cent of respondents who had direct contact with ministers and/or advisers during the 
previous year reported they did not find it difficult to balance the need to be apolitical, 
impartial and professional with that of being responsive to the government. This was similar to 
the 2009-10 result; Australian Public Service Commission (2011), ‘Chapter 3 – Values, 
Performance and Conduct’, State of the Service 2010-2011, http://www.apsc.gov.au/about-
the-apsc/parliamentary/state-of-the-service/state-of-the-service-2010/chapter-3-values,-
performance-and-conduct. 
33
  Walter (1986), op cit, p 147-149; Dunn (1995), op cit, p 512; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007b), 
‘Ministerial Advisers and the Politics of Policy-making: Bureaucratic Permanence and Popular 
Control’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(4), pp 453-467, p 462. 
34
  Dunn (1995), op cit, p 513; Maley (2002b), op cit, pp 274-275; Eichbaum and Shaw (2006), 
op cit, pp 11-12; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007b), op cit, p 457; Fawcett and Gay, op cit, p 46; 
Maley (2011), op cit, p 1473. 
35
  Walter (1986), op cit, p 147; Dunn (1995), op cit, p 511; Holloway (1996), op cit, p 134; 
Eichbaum and Shaw (2006), op cit, p13; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007b), op cit, p 459. 
36
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 33; Tiernan (2007), op cit, pp 220-222. 
37
  Hawke advisers were the first to attend cabinet committee meetings; Fitzgerald (1996), op cit, 
p 123; Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 69.  Rudd describes joint working groups of advisers and 
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relationship as inherently contested, arguing it is often seen as co-operative only 
because each party has an interest in managing the ‘competition and tension’.38  
Others see the potential for relationships that vary from collegiate to adversarial.39   
 
(b) Why advisers became part of the Westminster system 
 
The question of why advisers have rapidly become part of the ‘status quo’40 has 
received detailed attention.  The complexity of modern government is considered a 
major cause,41 linking this area to work on governance and policy networks.  With the 
change from hierarchical to networked governance, advisers assist ‘their principals 
[to] negotiate the mosaic of policy stakeholders, networks and communities that 
characterize contemporary governance environments’.42  Maley describes advisers 
crossing the organisational boundaries that constrain bureaucrats as they negotiate 
policy with other ministers’ offices and stakeholders,43 an ability valued by ministers.44  
Advisers can also operate in other arenas closed to public servants, including ‘the 
party, academia, the media and politically active parts of the community’.45  The 
modern 24-hour media cycle is another factor,46  as is the need for governments to 
exercise ‘meaningful control of the institutions of government’.47  Whitlam illustrated 
that point when, distrustful after his party’s long period in opposition, he used 
                                                                                                                                                              
public servants in Queensland; Rudd, op cit, p 96-97; Fawcett and Gay give examples of 
where important policy was made by UK ministers and advisers, with the public service 
largely excluded, including the decision to participate in the invasion of Iraq.  They also cite 
the substantial roles played by Tony Blair’s advisers, Alastair Campbell and Jonathon Powell, 
in the Irish peace process; Fawcett and Gay, op cit, p 48. 
38
  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 142-143.   
39
  Walter said it was only in extreme cases when departments seemed incompetent did advisers 
become ‘antagonistic and interventionist’; Walter, (1986), op cit, pp 149-150.  Ryan developed 
a typology of four different relationships varying from collegiate to adversarial according to the 
competence of the minister, the amount of external contest in a policy area, or differing values 
between the government and the bureaucracy; Ryan, op cit, p 153. 
40
  Anderson, op cit, p 181. 
41
  Walter (1986), op cit, pp 3 and 188; Eichbaum and Shaw (2007b), op cit, pp 464-465; 
Connaughton, op cit, p 348; Eichbaum and Shaw (2010), op cit, p 21; Eichbaum and Shaw, 
(2011), op cit, p 598. 
42
  Eichbaum and Shaw (2010), op cit, p 213.  
43
  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 465; Maley (2011), op cit, pp 1472-1473. 
44
  Ibid, p 1472; Walter (1986), op cit, p 131. 
45
  Walter cited in Anderson, op cit, p 183; Walter (1986), op cit, p 130. 
46
  Anderson, op cit, pp 178-180; Fawcett and Gay, op cit, pp 42-43; Maley (2010), op cit, p 101. 
47
  Smith, p cit, p 307 who described the need to exercise control as an ‘acute problem’ of 
modern government’. 
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advisers to exert control over the bureaucracy.48  The public sector management 
reforms of the 1980s sought control in a more systemic way, and are credited with 
significantly enhancing ‘the scope, power and influence of ministerial staff’.49   
 
(c) The legitimacy debate 
 
Debate continues about the legitimacy of advisers.  For Walter, advisers are an 
anomaly if the traditional distinction between the political executive and a public 
service giving impartial policy advice is accepted,50 and Smith agrees.51  Tiernan 
believes ministerial advisers disrupt ‘close, cooperative relationships between 
Ministers and their public service advisers’, which she says is one of the key tenants 
of Westminster governance.52  Others argue that tenant is actually an ‘ideal’,53 that in 
practice the rules are more pragmatic, 54  and the executive has long been open to 
advice from other sources.55    
 
(d) Accountability 
 
The traditional view of advisers as agents saw them as accountable to ministers who 
were, in turn, accountable to parliament and electors.56  However, that formulation 
has been questioned following controversies in the UK and Australia, where advisers 
exercised independent executive power.57  Earlier studies had found most advisers, 
as ‘creatures of their minister’, knew they could not act independently,58 and were 
                                                   
48
  Ibid, pp 292, 293 and 307; Walter (1986), op cit, p 52; Ryan, op cit, p 142; Anderson, op cit, p 
170.  This was also said to be a factor in Tony Blair’s increased use of advisers: Fawcett and 
Gay, op cit, p 41.    
49
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 10; also Maley (2002b), op cit, p 23; Anderson, op cit, p 172; 
Eichbaum and Shaw (2010), op cit, p 20. 
50
  Walter (2006), op cit, p 22. 
51
  Smith, op cit, p 303. 
52
  Tiernan (2007), op cit, p 234. 
53
  Eichbaum and Shaw (2007a), op cit, p 615, quoting Peter Shergold, former Secretary of the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
54
  Smith, op cit, p 303. 
55
  Eichbaum and Shaw (2007a), op cit, p 615.  They cite former Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Secretary Peter Shergold’s argument that policy advice from other sources is more 
democratic as well. 
56
  Maley (2002b), op cit, pp 64; Tiernan (2004), op cit, pp 38 and 213; Tiernan (2005), op cit, p 
4; Maley (2011), op cit, p 1486. 
57
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, pp 236 and 241; Anderson, op cit, p 168; Fawcett and Gay, op cit, pp 
47-48; Maley (2010), op cit, pp 107-108. 
58
  Walter, 1986, op cit, p 157. 
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careful how they portrayed their authority and role.59  Even so, Ryan thought their 
accountability wanting given advisers were ‘formidable actors’ in policy process.60   
 
It is now widely agreed that advisers are not sufficiently accountable, but there is no 
agreement on appropriate accountability mechanisms.  It is generally accepted that, 
in the children overboard affair, ministers used the inability of parliamentary 
committees to compel advisers to give evidence to hide from scrutiny themselves.61  
While this is said to have revealed a ‘serious accountability vacuum’,62 there is 
ongoing debate over whether advisers should be compelled to appear before 
committees.63  Mulgan argues it could have ‘harmful consequences’ as it would 
provide advisers with a public platform, creating ‘greater personal authority and 
independence’, and potentially compromising loyalty to their ministers.  He says their 
accountability remains ‘grounded in ministerial responsibility’.64  Similarly, Maley 
suggests it would be ‘dangerous’ as it ‘may destroy the confidential relationship 
between ministers and their staff’ and recommends reasserting the agency 
relationship to improve accountability.65  However, Tiernan and Weller call the 
agency relationship a ‘constitutional myth’ and support chiefs of staff appearing.66  
There is greater agreement on codes of conduct,67 and a Code of Conduct for 
Ministerial Advisers was introduced in 2008.68     
                                                   
59
  Dunn, 1995, op cit, p 516. 
60
  Ryan, op cit, p 156. 
61
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 244; Walter (2006), op cit, p 25; Tiernan (2007), op cit, pp 205-206; 
Maley (2010), op cit, pp 107-108. 
62
  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident (2002), op cit, p 173; Walter (2006), 
op cit, p 24. 
63
  Maley (2003), op cit, p 2; Tiernan and Weller (2003), ‘Ministerial Staff: A Need for 
Transparency and Accountability?’, Submission to the Senate Finance and Public 
Administration References Committee Inquiry Into Staff Employed Under the Members of 
Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=fapa_ct
te/completed_inquiries/2002-04/mops/submissions/sublist.htm, p 10.  Tiernan (2004), op cit, 
pp 243-244; Walter (2006), op cit, p 24; Mulgan (2012), ‘Advisers are already held to 
account’, The Canberra Times, 6 November.  
64
  Ibid. 
65
  Maley (2003), op cit, p 2. 
66
  Tiernan and Weller (2003), op cit, pp 9 and 10.   
67
  Which are said to influence behaviour through sanctions, education and by providing 
aspirational standards; O’Brien (1998), ‘A Code of Conduct for Parliamentarians?’, Research 
Paper No. 2 1998-99, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, p 13; Senate Finance and Public 
Administration References Committee, 2003, Report of the Inquiry into Staff Employed under 
the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, October, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, pp 
57-58. 
68
  For details about the Code of Conduct and the circumstances which lead to its introduction, 
see appendix 3.   
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The deficiencies in the accountability framework for advisers are considered out of 
step with trends in the public sector,69 and with society at large.70  For Walter, it 
means a potential asymmetry of power between advisers and public servants, 
creating a gap in institutional checks and balances.71   
 
(e) Conclusion 
 
While much of the literature on ministerial advisers is descriptive, seeking to 
understand a new role, debates have emerged.  It is accepted that advisers are here 
to stay, but some question their legitimacy and fit within the traditional Westminster 
framework. Others say the Westminster system is capable of adaptation, and in 
practice public servants have never had a monopoly on policy advice.  Another 
debate concerns the impact of advisers on the public service.  Some say the roles of 
advisers and public servants are complementary; others that they conflict, with 
considerable scope for confusion, and a reduction in public sector capacity.  A 
related question is whether advisers protect the public service from politicisation by 
undertaking political work, or whether they politicise the bureaucracy by seeking 
greater responsiveness.  The accountability of advisers has emerged as a concern, 
with a major debate over whether they remain agents of their ministers and whether 
they should be called before parliamentary committees.  Many of the studies 
concerning accountability rely on data from inquiries into scandals, but the extreme 
nature of those events deflects attention from the uncontentious, properly conducted 
day-to-day policy work of advisers.72  Some generalisations made may also be 
skewed because of the controversial nature of those events.  The research outlined 
in the next section aims to provide a fuller picture of how policy advisers behave to 
determine whether they still act as agents of their minister, and consider how 
ministers influence their behaviour.   
 
                                                   
69
  Walter (2006), op cit, p 22.  The introduction of the Code of Conduct, with its ban on advisers 
issuing executive directions, along with the publication of an annual report from 2008 
providing detailed statistics about advisers and other staff employed by members of 
parliament, has arguably gone some way to overcoming those deficiencies.   
70
  Fawcett and Gay, op cit, p 28. 
71
  Walter (2006), op cit, p 23. 
72
  Eichbaum and Shaw (2011), op cit, p 584. 
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2. Research question and hypothesis 
 
The research question investigated in this study asked, ‘What influence do ministers 
have in shaping and constraining the behaviour of their policy advisers?’.73  A 
hypothesis that ministers exert a dominant influence over the behaviour of their 
advisers was tested.  If the hypothesis is correct, the findings would counter 
Tiernan’s conclusion that advisers operate independently of their ministers and make 
executive decisions.74  They would also support the argument that the controversies 
Tiernan and others have based their findings on represent extremes of adviser 
behaviour rather than the norm, and add weight to the view that ministerial 
responsibility provides the best mechanism for advisers’ accountability.     
 
The hypothesis was drawn from Maley’s study of Keating government advisers 
where she found ministers were the main determinant of their advisers’ roles and 
levels of policy activity.  Although other factors played a part, she concluded the 
‘approach of the adviser had everything to do with how the minister operated and 
what his or her objectives were’.75  In constructing this hypothesis, it seemed logical 
to assume that ministerial influence would extend to behaviour itself.  Until the 
introduction of the Code of Conduct in 2008,76 there were few formal guidelines for 
advisers.77  This research investigated whether conventions of behaviour existed, 
and whether the Code affected behaviour.  Behaviour in this context means the way 
advisers conducted themselves in their policy role, including how they provided 
policy advice, negotiated outcomes, and oversaw policy implementation.  The 
research looked at how advisers interacted with their minister, colleagues and the 
bureaucracy.  It looked at how advisers analysed public service advice and how they 
                                                   
73
  In this paper, the term ‘advisers’ refers to both policy advisers and chiefs of staff but excludes 
media advisers and other staff such as researchers, office managers and other administrative 
staff.  Throughout this paper, where it is necessary to distinguish chiefs of staff, that title is 
used.   
74
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 241; see also Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime 
Incident, (2002), op cit, p xxxvii and 173.      
75
  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 102. 
76
  For details about the Code of Conduct and the circumstances which lead to its introduction, 
see appendix 3.     
77
  Some limited guidance was provided under the Howard Government’s A Guide on Key 
Elements of Ministerial Responsibility, which stated that ministers and parliamentary 
secretaries were responsible for the conduct of their staff, and made it clear advisers acted on 
behalf of their minister.  The rest of its provisions concerning ministerial staff covered conflicts 
of interest, outside employment, private interests, and acceptance of gifts and hospitality; 
Prime Minister (1998), A Guide on Key Elements of Ministerial Responsibility, Canberra, p 27.  
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mediated access to the minister and distilled information.  Those roles, functions and 
relationships were drawn from evidence to the inquiries arising from the children 
overboard affair78 and from Maley’s conceptualisation of advisers and their policy 
roles.79   
 
The research was conducted into the Rudd government.80  Researching advisers 
working in a government of the same political persuasion as in Maley’s study 
removed one potential intervening variable.  That the Rudd ministry governed over a 
decade later also provided the opportunity to see if advisers’ roles had developed.  
The findings provide an insight into the way policy advisers carry out their day-to-day 
work, giving a more detailed picture on which to base the accountability debate.  The 
findings should add to general understanding of a relatively new role, particularly as 
they arise from one of the first studies of the Rudd government.   
 
3. Methodology  
 
Empirical data on the forces which shape policy advisers’ behaviour came from 
semi-structured interviews conducted with four former ministers in the Rudd 
government, their chiefs of staff, and a policy adviser from each ministerial office.  In 
one case, a senior adviser who later became chief of staff was also interviewed.  
                                                   
78
  That advisers determine what information reaches ministers, control access to ministers, 
make decisions on their behalf and give directions to departments and agencies; Evans, H, 
(2003), Submission to the Finance and Public Administration References Committee’s inquiry 
into Staff employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=fapa_ct
te/completed_inquiries/2002-04/mops/submissions/sublist.htm, p  2. 
79
  Maley characterised advisers as either ‘passive/ reactive’, ‘active’ or ‘very active’. Those 
‘active’ and ‘very active’ advisers worked closely with senior bureaucrats and also had 
substantial policy roles outside that relationship, helping ministers set the policy agenda, 
negotiating with other ministers’ offices and stakeholders, and developing coalitions of 
support within and outside government. ‘Very active’ advisers had a drive to achieve major 
policy agendas, were highly directive and deeply involved in the department’s work.  They 
developed new policy ideas and saw policy implementation as shared with the department.  
They were active in setting policy agendas, developing and mobilising coalitions of policy 
interests, negotiating and delivering policy outcomes.   ‘Active’ advisers might do some or all 
of those things, but not consistently.  They rarely had a major policy agenda.  ‘Passive/ 
reactive’ advisers performed a limited version of those roles for ‘a variety of reasons’, 
including time spent performing non-policy roles; Maley (2000), op cit, pp 454-468; Maley 
(2002b), op cit, pp 101-102 and 166-202. 
80
  The Rudd government was sworn in 3 December 2007 and ended on 24 June 2010, when 
Kevin Rudd was removed as Prime Minister; Australian Labor Party, Kevin Rudd, Member for 
Griffith, http://www.alp.org.au/federal-government/labor-people/kevin-rudd/; National Archives 
of Australia, Australia’s Prime Ministers: Kevin Rudd, 
http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/rudd/.  
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This sample represented 13 per cent of the total population of Rudd government 
ministers81 and 3.9 per cent of advisers.82   
 
A realist approach was adopted.  Accounts from ministers and their staff provided 
observable evidence.  The effects of underlying social factors on adviser behaviour, 
such as their ministers’ standing, experience and portfolio and desire to avoid 
unnecessary controversy, were also considered.   
 
Semi-structured interviews, thought preferable for elite interviews, were used rather 
than structured interviews or surveys.83  They also allowed engagement with 
participants and probing to better understand answers, helping to capture variation 
and nuance and increase data validity.84  Given Maley’s findings about the highly 
contingent nature of ministerial influence,85 it was important to capture subtle 
variations.   
 
The interviews lasted from 50 to 80 minutes each, and took place between 15 
August and 11 October 2012, in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra.  Telephone 
interviews were conducted with two participants; the remainder were in person (see 
appendix 3).  Some data on former ministers, such as their portfolios and 
backgrounds, were obtained from public sources.   
 
Participants are not identified in this paper – a device to encourage candour and 
increase data reliability.86  Each minister is identified by a colour – Blue, Red, Green 
and Orange – with advisers identified by their position and the same colour as their 
                                                   
81
  There are 30 cabinet and non-cabinet ministers; Rudd Ministry List, 25 February 2008,  
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/53903/ 200905130000/www.pmc.gov.au/parliamentary/ 
docs/ministry_list.pdf. 
82
  As at 30 June 2010, just after the end of the Rudd government, there were 233 advisers 
(including chiefs of staff as per footnote 73).  That figure does not include media advisers and 
administrative staff who were not the subject of this study, but does include advisers from the 
prime minister’s office.  Department of Finance and Deregulation, (2010), Members of 
Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 Annual Report 2009-2010, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/mops_annual_reports/2009-
2010/content/10_personal_employee_positions.html, Table 22: Portfolio Government 
Personal Positions at 30 June 2010.  
83
  Halperin and Heath (2012), Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills, Oxford 
University Press, New York, pp 273-274. 
84
  Ibid, pp 253-254, 258 and 259. 
85
  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 99.  
86
  Halperin and Heath, op cit, p 179-180. 
  17 
minister.87  Care has been taken in writing the findings not to inadvertently identify 
participants.88  Where necessary, references to policy initiatives and portfolios are 
omitted from quotes. 
 
To determine the effect of the independent variable of ministers’ influence, 
information was obtained from ministers about whether they sought directly or 
indirectly to shape or control the behaviour of their staff and, if so, how.  Information 
on advisers’ reactions to their minister’s approach was sought, along with views on 
the importance of the minister in shaping behaviour against other potential factors.  
Advisers were asked about the effect of indirect factors such as their minister’s style 
and personality and whether they felt their behaviour reflected on their minister.  To 
determine whether the relationship between ministers and advisers was one of 
principal and agent, all participants were asked about decision-making, the degree of 
authority that was delegated to advisers, and how delegated authority was 
exercised.   
 
The research also assessed the impact of two potential intervening variables: 
advisers’ need to maintain a functional relationship with bureaucrats, and the 
influence of the Code of Conduct.  Advisers were asked about the nature of the 
relationship they cultivated with public servants, how they worked with them in 
different situations, and whether they argued for or against them to their ministers.  
Participants were also asked whether the Code of Conduct had affected adviser 
behaviour.   
 
Participant responses revealed three other possible intervening variables.  One was 
advisers’ personal view of acceptable behaviour, echoing Maley’s finding that 
advisers’ personal conceptions of their policy role helped determine their level of 
activity.89  Another was the moderating influence of the public service.  In a couple of 
cases, the precarious nature of advisers’ employment was also raised. 
 
                                                   
87
  The Senior Adviser who later became a Chief of Staff is referred to as Senior Adviser Green 
to distinguish him from Minister Green’s first Chief of Staff.   
88
  Halperin and Heath, op cit, p 180. 
89
  Maley (2002b), op cit, pp 113-115. 
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Seeking similar information from ministers, chiefs of staff and policy advisers from 
each ministerial office provided triangulation of the data, enabling corroboration of 
responses and increasing the credibility of the findings.90  While, ideally, interview 
responses would be tested against data such as documentary evidence,91 this was 
not possible for behavioural responses.  In any case, advisers’ activities are usually 
not reflected in records.92  However, strikingly similar responses were received from 
all participants, providing an indication that the data were sound. 
 
Ministers were not randomly selected; those with different backgrounds and 
personalities were approached to more robustly test the hypothesis and attempt to 
falsify it.93  It seemed possible that ministers’ approaches might vary depending on 
factors like the length of their ministerial experience or whether they were more 
politically or policy driven, and that those differences could produce data disproving 
the hypothesis.  Conversely, if they did not, then claims about the accuracy of the 
hypothesis would be strengthened.  Adding to this effect, each minister also had a 
variety of other characteristics.  They had different factional alignments and came 
from three different states.  Some were former Senators; others had served in the 
House of Representatives.  Their portfolios represented a mix of social and 
economic policy.  All were male (one female former minister was approached but 
declined to participate, however, out of the nine advisers interviewed four were 
female, providing some gender balance).  Minister Blue held a junior portfolio and 
had many years of parliamentary and ministerial experience.  Minister Red was a 
senior minister with considerable parliamentary experience and a strong interest in 
policy.  Minister Green held a junior portfolio, had long parliamentary experience, 
and expertise in a particular policy area.  Minister Orange, a junior minister, had the 
shortest time in parliament and the least policy experience.   
 
Of the nine advisers interviewed, four were chiefs of staff, four were policy advisers, 
and one, Senior Adviser Green, had worked both as a senior adviser and chief of 
staff.  Seven nominated an interest in policy as the primary reason for becoming an 
adviser.  The other two both came from policy areas in the public service, and policy 
                                                   
90
  Halperin and Heath, op cit, pp 177-178. 
91
  Halperin and Heath, op cit, pp 177-178. 
92
  Maley (2010), op cit, pp 105 and 107.   
93
  Popper’s falsification argument from Halperin and Heath, op cit, p 33. 
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was clearly their interest.  Five had prior policy experience, having worked in the 
public service.  Of the others, two were lawyers, one had a science background and 
one came from an electorate office.  Three advisers had worked in opposition, two 
for their ministers.  A fourth, the only subject specialist, had worked on policy with his 
minister in opposition as part of lobbying activity.  Eight had been, or were members 
of the Australian Labor Party, and the other described himself as ‘very aligned’.  Four 
had also worked for state government ministers.  The greatest length of service94  
was ten years; the shortest two and a half (although that adviser had spent the same 
period working for a shadow minister in opposition).  The average length of service 
was five and a half years.  More detail is provided in appendix 1.   
 
The approach of targeting ministers along with their advisers is novel.  It is the first 
time research has been conducted in a structured way on individual ministerial 
offices rather than on a government as a whole, providing an opportunity to 
investigate whether differences emerged between ministers’ offices.  Former 
ministers in the Rudd government were chosen as the potential sample population 
for several reasons.  Currently there are no published studies on that government 
and its advisers, so the research covered new ground, enabling comparison with 
previous studies.  The Rudd government also introduced the Code of Conduct and 
the study provided an opportunity to investigate its impact.  A practical reason was 
that, former ministers might have time to participate.  Also the author, as a former 
chief of staff to a Rudd and Gillard government minister, could rely on past 
relationships to contact participants.   
 
While the hypothesis was informed by experience gained and observations made 
while occupying that and other positions as a ministerial adviser, every effort was 
made to remove bias from the interview questions and analysis.  To avoid bias and 
encourage candour, the author chose not to interview the minister she had worked 
for, or policy advisers she had supervised.   
  
                                                   
94
  Service includes service to state government ministers but excludes service as an opposition 
adviser. 
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Chapter 3 – How ministers influence advisers’ behaviour  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The influence of ministers on the behaviour of their advisers was clearly 
demonstrated.  This chapter examines the strength of that influence, how it was 
exerted, and how advisers reacted.  Advisers in the Rudd government saw 
themselves as agents, operating as extensions of their minister, explaining why 
ministers were able to wield such influence.  This contrasts with the conclusions of 
the Senate inquiry into the children overboard affair that advisers were exercising 
autonomous executive authority,95 supporting the argument that those circumstances 
were exceptional rather than the norm.   
 
The nature of the relationship between ministers and advisers was a defining 
influence on advisers’ behaviour.  Ministers as principals assumed they had the right 
to control their advisers’ behaviour, either directly or through their chiefs of staff.  
Advisers as agents complied.  Ministers established standards and created an office 
culture, providing a behavioural framework.  Some would chide advisers for 
misbehaviour, and others mentioned their right to sack advisers for major 
transgressions.  Ministers also exerted an indirect influence as advisers modified 
their behaviour to suit ministers’ personalities, styles and preferences.  Ministers’ 
recruitment decisions may also have played a part in the close alignment that was 
evident.  Advisers saw themselves as representing their minister and had a strong 
sense that their behaviour reflected on them.  This was another constraint, as was 
the need to maintain their minister’s trust.  These findings support Maley’s 
observations that ‘[t]he styles and objectives of ministers determined how their 
advisers behaved’,96 and the ‘approach of the adviser had everything to do with how 
the minister operated and what his or her objectives were’.97   
 
Striking commonality emerged from the different ministers and their offices about the 
limits on advisers’ delegated authority.  Strong norms were evident among all 
                                                   
95
  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident (2002), op cit, p 173. 
96
  Maley (2003), op cit, p 2. 
97
  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 102. 
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advisers concerning the exercise of that authority.  Ministers delegated considerable 
authority to advisers, but all participants recognised that ministers, as elected 
representatives, were the final decision-makers.  This was a powerful constraint on 
adviser behaviour.  Common situations were investigated – the way advisers 
conducted policy negotiations, passed on information, and made decisions about 
people seeking to meet ministers – to determine how advisers behaved.  The minor 
variations in adviser behaviour that emerged are attributed to differing seniority, 
service as an opposition adviser, and higher levels of activity in policy processes.  
Some advisers were more active than others in policy processes, as Maley’s study 
found.98  Some of the more active advisers, particularly those who had worked in 
opposition, tended to act the most autonomously.   
 
2. The nature of the relationship between minister and adviser 
 
This section presents the views of ministers and advisers about the nature of their 
relationship.  All participants saw it as one between principal and agent.  This reflects 
the traditional view that advisers operate as an extension of ministers, who are the 
sole source of their authority,99 and accountable for their conduct and decisions.100  
All ministers said they were the decision-makers.  Their advisers readily accepted 
this, acknowledging ministers’ status as elected representatives.  Some advisers 
explicitly described the relationship as one of principal and agent.  For others, that 
understanding was implicit through their descriptions of the limits to their authority.   
 
Ministers clearly viewed their advisers as their agents.  Minister Orange said, ‘as far 
as I was concerned, if [Chief of Staff Orange] spoke, then I spoke’.  Minister Red 
thought, ‘in effect the minister knows everything that is going on, and is a hidden 
hand behind all staff behaviour’.  If his advisers were ‘being stonewalled by a staffer 
in this office, or somebody’s not cooperating there’, he would remind them that ‘you 
                                                   
98
  Maley (2002b), op cit, pp 100-102.   
99
  Smith, op cit, p 301; Walter (1986), op cit, p 1; Ryan, op cit, p 155; Maley (2000), op cit, p 
469; Maley (2002b), op cit, p 64; Maley (2003), op cit, p 2; Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 38; 
Tiernan (2005), op cit, pp 4 and 38; Fawcett and Gay (2010), op cit, p 30; Eichbaum and 
Shaw (2011), op cit, p 595. 
100
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, pp 38 and 213; Tiernan (2005), op cit, p 4; Mulgan (2012), op cit.   
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are dealing with somebody who is, in effect, an extension of the minister, and if 
they’re behaving in that way the odds are very, very high that that is because that is 
how the minister wants them to behave.  And if you’re upset with them rather than 
the minister, then that’s probably how the minister would prefer it as well’.  Ministers 
also said they would take responsibility for their adviser’s actions, unless they were 
obviously acting completely outside the terms of their delegation.  Minister Red for 
example said he would always accept responsibility for the actions of this staff 
unless ‘somebody acts in a way that is so patently outside the way they are 
instructed to and expected to fulfil their responsibilities that it should be obvious to 
anybody’.   
 
Likewise, all advisers saw themselves as agents, with some explicitly describing the 
relationship in such terms.  Chief of Staff Green said, ‘we’re an extension of him’ 
adding, ‘the reality always was that we were agents, active agents, of our minister’.  
Adviser Red said, ‘if there had ever been anything like advisers ... trying to kind of 
usurp the decision-making power of the minister as the principal, then that would 
have been, in effect, the end of your working relationship’.  Others described an 
agency relationship when explaining how they acted in policy negotiations.  Chief of 
Staff Blue told advisers, ‘We are not the minister.  Now any decisions that we make 
have to be on the basis that we have an understanding ... that it totally reflects what 
the minister would or wouldn’t do’.  Reflecting his status as an agent, he was careful 
not to appear to commit his minister, saying ‘you’d make it clear you were having the 
meeting ... to form a view that you can brief the minister on’.  Chief of Staff Orange 
said, ‘if you’re trying to draw that line ... that tightrope you’re walking along about 
what you’re allowed to do and what you’re not allowed to do ... you know you’re off it 
if your boss doesn’t agree with it.  And that’s just difficult all over’.   
 
Principals make the final decisions in an agency relationship, and all ministers said 
they did so.  When Minister Red was asked whether he was comfortable with 
advisers making decisions in policy negotiations he responded, ‘an actual, concrete, 
substantive decision?  That’s ultimately what I’ve got to do’, adding that he thought 
advisers were engaged in ‘the process of ... manufacturing the content of decisions 
and you then have the minister ... executing’.  Even so, ministers encouraged 
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advisers to disagree with them, as in Dunn’s study.101  Minister Green talked about 
occasional ‘hot policy debates’ with his advisers, for example.  But all ministers said 
advisers ultimately had to accept their decisions.  Minister Blue jokingly mentioned 
‘conspiracies’ by his staff which ‘were sometimes about trying to persuade me to 
follow a different course of action’.  However, in a clear indication of the nature of 
relationship, he said if advisers’ conspiracies contained ‘any malice there, then one 
would sack them’.  Minister Red said he wanted advisers to ‘argue the point and to 
stand up to me up to the point where I hit a decision-making mode’.  Similarly, 
Minister Orange said, ‘if they disagree with it, then they raise it with you, and if they 
can’t get you to change your mind then they had to live with it’.   
 
All advisers were clear that ministers made substantive and final decisions because 
they were elected representatives.  Typical responses included Chief of Staff Blue, 
who said, ‘I have that view that I’m not the elected official.  They’re the one who’s 
going to be accountable’.  Similarly, Chief of Staff Orange said, ‘I am not an elected 
official.  My name does not go on a ballot paper.  It is not my job to actually make 
decisions’.  Dunn found the same, with advisers aware ‘we are not the 
democratically elected representatives’.102 
 
Many advisers made a distinction between process decisions, which they could 
make if they knew their minister’s objectives, and final policy decisions.  Adviser Blue 
said, ‘the kinds of decisions that I might make were mostly process things anyway’.  
For other decisions she ‘would give advice, but without the imprimatur of [her chief of 
staff or minister], I wouldn’t be saying, “Go a different way”’.  Adviser Green made a 
distinction between substantive policy decisions and implementation decisions.  ‘If it 
was a decision about whether we do it this way or this way’, he said, ‘then that’s 
different.  But when you basically have no room to move, and the decision is 
basically about how you get there, then the best outcome is to sort it out yourself’.   
 
Ministers as the principals determined how much authority would be delegated to 
their advisers and the terms on which that authority would be exercised.  Minister 
                                                   
101
  Dunn (1997), op cit, p 102.  Dunn’s research covered the Hawke-Keating governments and 
the first six months of the Howard government.  
102
  Dunn (1997), op cit, p 103.   
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Red talked about giving advisers ‘riding orders’, Minister Blue about establishing 
‘frameworks’ through continual discussion.  The latter also spoke about how advisers 
determined the point at which they, ‘stopped and said “I can’t agree to that without 
the minister’s approval”’.  The question of ministerial delegation is explored fully 
section three below.   
 
3. The influence of ministers on advisers’ behaviour  
 
This section examines how ministers exerted influence over their advisers’ 
behaviour, and how advisers reacted.  Ministers exerted influence by explicitly 
conveying their expectations about behaviour and standards.  They also deliberately 
created an office culture that established a framework for adviser behaviour.  The 
force of their personalities, styles and preferences also played a part.  Advisers felt 
bound to meet standards set by their ministers, and modified their own work 
preferences and approaches to suit those of their ministers.  They strongly felt their 
behaviour reflected on their minister.  This was a constraint, even outside work.   
 
(a) Setting standards  
 
All ministers deliberately tried to influence advisers’ behaviour by establishing 
expectations and setting standards.  Advisers, as agents, reacted to those 
messages.  Minister Blue wanted to ‘try to ensure that there is a spirit of 
collaboration among the staff and that they accept that their role is, as far as 
reasonably possible, to collaborate with the bureaucracy’.  This approach was clear 
to his chief of staff and adviser, both talking about the need for collaborative working 
relationships.  Minister Red said he would ‘both explicitly and implicitly give people 
thoughts about what was desired and not desired’.  He wanted advisers to deal with 
the content of issues, maintain good relationships with other ministers’ offices, and 
deal courteously with the public.  Regarding the public service, motivated partly by 
self-interest, Minister Red would send a ‘“We need them more than they need us” 
message’, which meant ‘a strong imperative on treating the department with respect’.  
He wanted his advisers to understand, without a good relationship, that ‘people in 
the department can do all sorts of ugly things to me that could conceivably end up 
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being fatal, and I would prefer to avoid that’.  Those messages were heard by his 
advisers.  His chief of staff ‘tried to cultivate a very good relationship with the 
department.  We would be very open with them’.  Adviser Red used nearly the same 
words to describe her relationship with the department.     
 
Minister Green wanted his staff to be courteous and to have ‘a good, strong working 
relationship with people in the public sector and also outside in the private sector, 
[and] with your political colleagues’. He raised those expectations during interviews 
of new staff and on their appointment.  With his new chief of staff he ‘had a couple of 
very long conversations about my expectations, my style, my approach’.  Chief of 
Staff Green confirmed a ‘long discussion early on about ... our expectations of 
professionalism, of ethics, of meeting and exceeding standards set on politicians’.  
However, Chief of Staff Green was the only chief of staff who thought his minister did 
not actively set standards, partly because his minister had accepted his ideas about 
office systems without question.  Both he and his minister saw enforcement of 
standards primarily as the chief of staff’s responsibility, and he was active in that 
regard.  While not stated by either participant, this may also have contributed to his 
view.   
 
Minister Orange wanted his staff ‘to be extremely professional.  Because when an 
adviser’s speaking, most people view it as the minister speaking’.  He sought 
advisers with ‘a good level of judgement [and] ... maturity who could deal with 
bureaucrats, could deal with politicos but at the same time could manage 
stakeholders’.  He emphasised he wanted toughness in a chief of staff.  This was the 
only instance where this attribute was not reflected directly in his advisers’ 
responses.  However, his chief of staff’s persistence and determination in dealing 
with a difficult, underperforming senior public servant through time-consuming 
weekly meetings probably demonstrates this characteristic.     
 
Minister Orange’s comments point to recruitment decisions also having an effect, 
with ministers hiring advisers who reflected qualities they valued.  Minister Blue said 
that a minister ‘should work strenuously to acquire a chief of staff with whom they 
have a high level of sympathy’, while his chief of staff talked about recruiting advisers 
who were ‘sympathetic to [Minister Blue’s] way of thinking’.  Chief of Staff Red said 
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his minister ‘didn’t want a bunch of political flacks’, so he looked for advisers ‘who 
had an eye to politics but weren’t political’.  He also said he and Minister Red ‘were 
quite careful in the selection process for advisers, thinking about how they would fit, 
what the organics and the chemistry of the office would be’.   
 
Minister Orange was the only minister to directly rebuke advisers if they 
transgressed his standards.  Chief of Staff Orange said that while that didn’t happen 
often, ‘if somebody had behaved in what he thought ... rudely or something, then he 
would absolutely at that point say, “You’re representing me”’.  Other ministers were 
not as direct.  If an adviser made a mistake, Minister Red’s reaction was mostly a 
‘raise of the eyebrows’ because, ‘Almost invariably that process [working through the 
problem] in itself would, if there was any doubt at all, clarify in the person’s mind that 
they’d made a bungle and you could see that they were kind of pretty chastised’.   
 
Ministers sought to control their advisers’ behaviour because, as Minister Orange 
said, advisers represented them and their behaviour could reflect badly on ministers 
or cause them problems.  Minister Red said that ‘one of the scary things about being 
a minister is that you are kind of a captive of staff behaviour’.  He said if a staff 
member dealt rudely with a member of the public then ‘the next thing you know, 
that’ll be being raised in parliament and the individual staff member’s not the head on 
the block.  It’s me!’.  As discussed above, for similar reasons he also wanted his 
advisers to have a good relationship with the public service.  It was also clear that 
ministers as the principals sought to impart their values to their advisers when they 
asked them to act courteously treat others with respect or work in a collegiate 
manner.   
 
(b) Creating an office culture 
 
All ministers tried to set an office culture which created a framework for advisers’ 
behaviour.  A good example was Minister Blue’s desire for a collaborative approach 
between advisers and the bureaucracy.  He said, ‘I always assumed that a job of a 
sensible minister is to consciously create a milieu in which the number of advisers 
and officials could work together and agree about the most important things’.  His 
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Chief of Staff reflected this, describing the office as ‘a collaborative and “talk through 
issues” kind of place’.  Minister Blue’s adviser thought her minister created a culture 
through his personality, saying, ‘I suppose [Minister Blue] was just [himself] and that 
was the culture anyway’.  That might be because, as Minister Red said, ‘what 
happens, in any small organisation of that kind, the leading figure on a perpetual 
basis sends out signals of what is approved and what not approved, what is desired, 
what is not desired, and people working there absorb these subconsciously, just 
continuously, and behave accordingly’.   
 
(c) Ministers’ preferences and approach 
 
Advisers talked about modifying their behaviour to fit their ministers’ preferences and 
personality.  This provided a strong indication of an agency relationship, and 
demonstrated that advisers reacted to their ministers’ influence.  Chief of Staff Blue 
observed, ‘you should be able to gauge ... what makes them tick and work to that’.  
He sometimes acted less robustly than he preferred, saying ‘I know how he wants to 
work.  Whereas some people might make me bad tempered and I’d tell them to piss 
off, well, I wouldn’t because it’s not how he’d behave’.  He also adopted different 
work methods, saying ‘there were ways that [Minister Blue] wanted to do stuff that I 
personally, quite deeply, didn’t really care about, but I knew that was his approach, 
and so I would follow that approach’.  Other advisers also used their minister as a 
reference point.  Chief of Staff Orange said, ‘you watch them and you take your 
guide from them.  And if they’re an open, friendly kind of a person, then that’s the 
way you are.  Whereas if you know that they’re not, then it would be kind of odd for 
you to be’.   
 
All advisers except one thought their behaviour reflected on their minister, including 
behaviour outside work, and this was a strong constraint.  ‘I was very conscious, and 
I think advisers need to be, that whatever you say, you are speaking for your boss’, 
Chief of Staff Red said, adding this extended to behaviour outside work.  Chief of 
Staff Green said, ‘everything that we do, and I was pretty militant about this both at a 
personal level and a professional level, so out of work and at work, is directly a 
reflection of the minister that you work for’.  Chief of Staff Orange agreed, saying ‘I 
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constantly thought, and said overtly to advisers, “What you do reflects on him”.  And 
he said that too’.  The only exception was Adviser Red, who said while she ‘had an 
obligation to act with integrity and to serve [Minister Red’s] interest’, she didn’t think 
her actions reflected on him ‘because he was such a strong personality in his own 
right and people knew what he stood for’.   
 
4. Ministers’ delegation of authority 
 
This section reports on how much authority ministers delegated, why delegation 
varied, and how advisers knew the scope of their authority.  It considers how 
advisers acted during policy negotiations to see how they exercised their delegated 
authority, and to determine the impact of variations in delegation.  Policy negotiations 
were investigated because this is a major role which enables advisers to wield 
considerable influence.  Two other important activities that can affect ministerial 
policy decisions were also investigated: how advisers present information to 
ministers, and how they deal with people seeking access to ministers.  Those areas 
were chosen partly to obtain more detail on how advisers exercised their delegated 
authority, and partly to investigate claims they behave illegitimately when making 
such decisions.  To complete the picture, differences in advisers’ behaviour when 
exercising their delegated authority are also examined.  Advisers’ need to maintain 
their minister’s trust was a constant theme in all the findings and emerged as another 
constraint.  Chief of Staff Orange thought trust was ‘completely what [the relationship 
is] based on’, adding ‘if they don’t trust you, you can’t do [the job].  And you may as 
well not bother either’.   
 
Ministers said they delegated considerable authority to advisers.  This was also their 
advisers’ perception, although contingent factors affected the degree of delegation.  
Advisers said ministers had to get to know them first and trust their capacity and 
judgement.  Advisers then exercised their authority reasonably independently, but 
only once they were confident they understood their minister’s approach and policy 
goals.  This reflects Dunn’s findings.103  The more senior advisers were delegated 
more authority, and were more confident exercising it.  However, in policy areas 
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where ministers were more interested, advisers had less delegation.  Advisers often 
made process decisions during policy negotiations, but those who worked for 
ministers who wanted to make process decisions themselves had less scope for 
independent action.  Contrary to Maley’s findings that advisers often reported directly 
to ministers,104 chiefs of staff closely supervised less experienced advisers, helping to 
ensure delegated authority was properly exercised and behaviour met expected 
standards.  This appears to be an institutional development since the Keating 
government.  The evidence found in this study raised considerable doubt about 
claims that advisers prevent information from reaching ministers and block people 
who seek access.   
 
(a) How much authority was delegated and how delegation varied 
 
Broad delegation was made to most advisers once trust was established, particularly 
to chiefs of staff and more experienced policy advisers.  However, all advisers clearly 
understood the limits to their authority.  ‘I had a pretty broad discretion’, Chief of Staff 
Blue said, ‘[Minister Blue] had a high level of trust of me’.  However, he had daily 
conversations, including on weekends, to ensure his minister was kept ‘in the loop’ 
and confirm his judgements were correct.  ‘I would always tell [Minister Blue] after 
the fact, in case I had to ring up and say, “Oops, no.  The minister didn’t say that 
actually after all”.  But I never actually had to do that’.   
 
Minister Red gave his advisers ‘a lot of authority in dealing with the department’.  He 
would tell them, ‘You’re in charge of this matter so when I need to be brought into the 
picture, please do.  But you don’t need to be tugging my sleeve every five minutes’.  
When advisers were dealing with other ministerial offices, he said their authority 
‘would depend a bit on the issue’.  Chief of Staff Red agreed that his minister 
delegated considerable authority, saying ‘He was happy for me and happy for 
advisers to go and negotiate on his behalf and use his name’, although if he had a 
particular view, ‘he’d give you some riding instructions ... not riding really, but some 
loose guidance’.  Chief of Staff Red thought the clear policy objectives in his 
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minister’s portfolio provided ‘your pointer’, making it easier to properly exercise 
delegated authority.   
 
Chief of Staff Green had ‘Pretty wide authority, very wide actually’ on gaining his 
minister’s trust.  He also attributed this to having similar values to Minister Green and 
to recognising the limits to his authority.  He said the authority delegated by Minister 
Green to other advisers varied.  He and his minister had ‘set down some red lines 
about when something was elevated into, I guess, a strategic level. You know, does 
this policy kind of move the big tectonic plates that sit under [that policy area]... .  
That’s when it had to involve me or the minister, before it was progressed too far.  
Anything that was controversial that could be of political or political internal risk.  That 
was straight to me’.   
 
Minister Orange said he delegated considerable authority to his chief of staff, and 
she confirmed this.  However, he wanted her to ‘keep a close eye’ on some of his 
other advisers who were inexperienced.  He thought, ‘The staff’s job is to free the 
minister up. ... If the minister has to keep making decisions every minute of the day, 
then how do you do your job?’.   
 
The degree of delegation could vary with different policy areas.  One variation came 
from ministers’ differing levels of interest.  Chief of Staff Blue said, ‘the stuff he was 
most interested in, I had the least delegation on, because he was interested ... [and] 
much more intimately involved, and I would defer to him a lot more’.  Chief of Staff 
Green said that in less important portfolio areas, the minister usually ‘just wants his 
staff to deal with it’.   
 
Variations in delegation also occurred when a policy area was being reformed or the 
area was controversial.  Minister Green wanted to be kept closely informed about 
policy implementation in reform areas saying, ‘I think you’ve got to be, as a minister, 
across those details’.  Minister Orange said delegation varied ‘issue by issue’ but he, 
‘would be quite involved in it, if you’re working on a problem or some sort of policy’.  
The perceived degree of political risk also had an effect.  Minister Blue said that 
because of time pressure he ‘would try to understand what was going on ... but only 
pay serious attention to those issues that I thought were either going to give me 
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serious political trouble or which I thought were important in an intellectual and policy 
sense’.   
 
A minister’s personality and approach could also alter the degree of delegation.  
Chief of Staff Orange, who had worked with several ministers in different 
jurisdictions, provided the clearest example, finding she had less delegation with a 
minister who had a less open personality.  This made it harder to anticipate his 
decisions.  She said, ‘when I worked with [Minister X], he had his own views, and if I 
didn’t know, I couldn’t guess ... .  So that was harder because I would always have to 
keep going back to check’.  That minister was prescriptive about process, limiting her 
discretion, ‘Because ... I’ve got to keep going back to you each time so that you can 
renavigate the next step’.  Minister Orange, on the other hand, simply told her the 
outcome he wanted, which was empowering, ‘I felt that [Minister Orange] trusted me, 
so that gave me more confidence to do it’.   
 
Chief of Staff Red thought ‘the personality of your boss and the way they’re 
perceived internally has a significant effect on the way you carry out your job’, but he 
also thought advisers had to sometimes ignore those factors to carry on the business 
of government.  ‘I think that the role of a staffer is somewhat timeless’, he explained,  
‘and actually has to move or set aside the personality and how the minister is 
perceived by their colleagues.  You have to make a lot of effort just to ignore how 
perceptions of individual politicians play with other politicians and just get on at the 
staffer level and transact stuff, basically’.  This observation is similar to Maley’s 
finding that advisers in the Keating government worked hard to keep their 
relationships functioning, even when those between their ministers were hostile.105   
 
(b) How advisers knew the scope of their delegation 
 
In trying to describe the limits to their delegation, advisers found it somewhat difficult 
to articulate precisely how they determined which decisions they could make in 
policy negotiations and which they would refer to their minister.  In part, this difficulty 
in making generalisations arose because the contingent factors associated with 
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different policy areas, which have been discussed above, changed advisers’ 
delegated authority.  It was also because there were few explicit conversations about 
delegation.  However, advisers made a clear distinction between process decisions 
which they could make, and final or substantive decisions which were for their 
ministers.  This has been explored above in the discussion about the nature of the 
relationship between minister and adviser.   
 
Advisers were also clearly operating within a decision-making framework which 
helped them make competent judgements and remain within the terms of their 
delegated authority.  That framework was developed through ongoing policy 
discussions with their minister, and the many meetings they attended between 
ministers, the department and stakeholders.  In that way, advisers came to know the 
content of policy areas and understand what decisions should be made by the 
minister.  As Minister Blue said, ‘there’s continuous discussion ... .  There’s meetings 
of the staff, there’s meetings of the staff and me, there’s meetings of the bureaucracy 
and me with an adviser, and these things all constantly intersect’.  His Chief of Staff 
said, ‘I had pretty constant and candid conversations with [Minister Blue] about, “This 
is what’s happening, what do you think, and I’m kinda doing this”’.  Similarly, Adviser 
Blue said ‘because it was such a small office, we talked about everything anyway’.  
Those discussions forged a deep understanding of a minister’s goals and 
preferences.  Minister Red thought his advisers were ‘implicitly’ operating within a 
framework.  He said, ‘after a fairly short period of time, again if you run that office 
informally, people get to know basically how the place runs, what’s expected of 
them, and what degree of licence they have’.  This reflects Dunn’s findings that the 
constant interaction between ministers and their advisers exposed advisers to in-
depth, detailed expositions of the minister’s attitudes, allowing them to accurately 
anticipate ministers’ likely views and reactions.106    
 
Advisers’ deep understanding of their minister’s goals and preferences meant they 
could anticipate ministerial decisions and act competently as agents.  Adviser Blue 
said, ‘I’d say I did have a fair bit [of delegation], but I guess because I knew him so 
well, I had kind of understood what his priorities were and what he wanted to see out 
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of things’.  Most advisers talked about exercising more discretion in policy 
negotiations once they came to know their minister.  ‘I mean, in the beginning I had 
no clue’, Chief of Staff Orange said, ‘I could do what I think ... what I thought was 
right.  But not knowing him, I didn’t really know what he would think.  So, you know, it 
took a while’.  But once she knew what his view would be, then she felt she had ‘a 
lot’ of delegated authority and ‘you also know what steps along the way he would 
agree with.  And that just comes from knowing them’.   
 
(c) Two decision-making processes 
 
This section examines two areas in which advisers commonly make decisions and 
exercise judgement that can affect ministerial policy decisions: handling information 
intended for the minister, and dealing with requests to meet the minister.  This 
provides an insight into two common daily activities, as well as an opportunity to 
examine claims that advisers often exercise their authority improperly by blocking 
information and access, thereby hindering policy processes.107  This section finds 
claims that this is a common occurrence to be exaggerated.   
 
Ministers said they wanted advisers to distil and prioritise information.  Minister Blue, 
reflecting the comments of other ministers, said ‘outsiders never really understand 
how busy ministerial offices ... are.  There’s all sorts of issues running all the time 
and somebody has to be sorting them enough to ensure that the minister can deal 
with them, or to deal with the most urgent issues as they arise’.  Advisers said they 
summarised information but, with a couple of exceptions discussed below, did not 
withhold information altogether.   
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All advisers put their written advice on top of departmental briefs, reflecting practices 
found in earlier studies.108  That advice commonly included a summary of the brief, 
the adviser’s own views and advice, and recommendations for action.  While this 
process can be seen as one way advisers filter information, Minister Red found it 
useful and would think carefully about cases where his advisers and department 
disagreed.  He would not use his adviser’s advice ‘as a substitute for reading the 
brief and thinking about it as well, [but] it was a very good reference point for me’.  
Chief of Staff Blue made the point that his minister was always able to read the 
departmental brief, even though his note was on the front.   
 
Some advisers commented that they had a broader range of considerations than 
public servants.  As Chief of Staff Green put it, ‘political advisers are political 
advisers.  You do take a policy and you put some lens of politics over it.  And you 
might be aware of a whole range of political pressures that the department should 
not be aware of, and it’s not wrong that they’re not aware of them’.  That account 
also supports the arguments of Smith, Dunn and others that advisers protect the 
bureaucracy from politicisation.109  
 
Advisers did not stop departmental briefs going to the minister.  Adviser Orange said, 
‘the briefs are not for you.  They’re for them.  And while sometimes I would disagree 
strongly with the content, I would make sure that I’d got my views down’.  Although 
advisers returned briefs to the department for more work if they judged them 
inadequate, most junior advisers did that in consultation with their chief of staff.  No 
one requested recommendations be changed.  All advisers, like Chief of Staff Red, 
would ‘work with the department to try to get something that was a bit better, in a bit 
better shape.  But it wasn’t blocking because I disagreed with their advice.  It was 
more because I thought their advice was incompetent’.   
 
However, discussions between advisers and bureaucrats could result in changes 
being made.  Chief of Staff Green said he and other advisers would debate concerns 
                                                   
108
  Smith, op cit, p 300; Walter (1986), op cit, p 147; Dunn (1995), op cit, p 509; Dunn (1997), op 
cit, pp 79-80; Maley (2002b), op cit p 91; Connaughton (2010), op cit, p 359; Eichbaum and 
Shaw (2011), op cit, p 587. 
109
  Smith, op cit, pp 293 and 304; Dunn (1995), op cit, pp 513 and 517; Eichbaum and Shaw 
(2007b), op cit, p 459; Maley (2010), op cit, p 101. 
  35 
with the department but, ‘It wasn’t like, “You’re wrong, change it”.  It was, you know, 
“What does that mean?  If you think about it from this perspective, how does that 
work?  That doesn’t work with that”.  ... Sometimes from those discussions there 
were changes, sometimes there were not’.  Chief of Staff Orange said, ‘Sometimes 
them explaining would convince you, no, actually they were right’.   
 
Three advisers, all senior, talked about occasional decisions they made, for a variety 
of reasons, to keep briefs from their minister.  Chief of Staff Red talked about a 
couple of occasions when he considered a brief from the department to be so 
deficient it could not be repaired, and it would cause his minister damage to sign it.  
He said, ‘another thing the bureaucracy don’t get, ministers are in the gun for every 
piece of advice ... .  They own it once they sign it’.  Sometimes he signed inadequate 
briefs, saying ‘So if they [ministers] don’t sign it, then I own it and I can be shot.  I 
can be fired.  But sometimes it was so bad I wouldn’t sign it.  I would put it in the 
bottom drawer’.  
 
In another example, both Senior Adviser Green and Chief of Staff Orange said they 
did not put some departmental briefs to their ministers that were so inconsequential 
as to be judged a waste of the minister’s time.  In the third example, where a series 
of departmental briefs for information were received, Senior Adviser Green would 
consolidate them and present them at the time he considered best.  He said, ‘I had 
this quaint view that you don’t waste a minister’s time getting him across stuff until he 
needs to know it.  And so there were many briefs that were about a situation in 
progress where he didn’t need to know that just now.  So I wouldn’t fill his headspace 
with it.  ... you need a complete picture and you need to give a minister things at the 
right time’.  It is worth noting that these actions could only happen with briefs that 
were relatively unimportant, such as information briefs, because departments have 
systems to track them and, as several advisers pointed out, public servants can raise 
unsigned briefs with ministers during departmental meetings.  Adviser Orange also 
said she ‘wouldn’t want to get in trouble’ which might happen if the department told 
the minister she had repeatedly rejected a brief.   
 
Contradicting claims that advisers block access to ministers, advisers rarely had 
sufficient control to do that.  All ministers made decisions themselves about who they 
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would meet.  At first, Minister Orange had his chief of staff make some decisions, but 
later adopted the same practice as other ministers, seeing all requests himself.  
Minister Red said, ‘I’m very strongly of the view that if a staff member is blocking 
somebody from seeing a minister, that’s because the minister wants them blocked’.  
Other parliamentarians were never refused time with a minister, nor were public 
servants, and all ministers had regular meetings with their departments anyway.  
Advisers would, however, make recommendations about requests for meetings, 
providing an opportunity to influence ministers’ decisions.  Chief of Staff Green, like 
other advisers, commented that ‘there were times when we were surprised and he 
would want to meet someone and it was completely left field’.  Advisers would 
commonly take meetings their minister’s didn’t agree to.  For instance, Chief of Staff 
Blue would say, ‘Okay.  Here’s the people who want to see you ... .  Which ones do 
you want me to see and you not to see?’.   
 
With one minor exception, no adviser prevented people from seeing their minister.  
Chief of Staff Blue said ‘I would never like hide anyone from him so he wouldn’t know 
that they were trying to see him.  And I would never make a decision myself.  It was 
up to him’.  Senior Adviser Green noted there were some groups he thought would 
waste his minister’s time ‘But you have to hear them, just for completeness so you 
could never be blindsided’.  Chief of Staff Orange said that was not her place to 
block access, and ‘that would be stupid on the adviser’s part because, again, the 
minister will always find out, particularly if it’s an MP’.  She added, ‘I might actually 
block if the person was nuts’ but, ‘More likely though, I would tell him that they are 
really wanting to meet him, and I was trying to stop it happening, in case they 
cornered him somewhere.  So he would ... be prepared’.  In one instance, Chief of 
Staff Red deviated from that practice because he judged further meetings with an 
interest group would cause his minister ‘damage’.  After Minister Red twice met the 
group on a non-portfolio issue, he and the minister’s diary secretary would, ‘just 
throw their invitations in the bin.  Because they were completely inappropriate for a 
Labor person to be meeting’.     
 
Advisers would never block public servants, but would sometimes meet with them 
first.  Chief of Staff Red explained, ‘Sometimes departmental people would want to 
meet the minister about certain things and I would say, “Well I don’t think it’s ready.  
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Let’s just have a staff meeting. And then we’ll sort of work that out.  And then we’ll 
have a chat [with the minister]”’.  He did this because ministers ‘don’t like poorly 
formed, irritating hour-long meetings.  They like a degree of precision. ... And they 
want outcomes at the end’.  He felt bureaucrats were comfortable with longer, more 
discursive meetings, and that advisers bridged the gap between the preferences of 
the bureaucracy and the minister.   
  
(d) Variations in decisions advisers made  
 
Within the framework of the minister as the final decision-maker, three advisers gave 
examples of undertaking relatively autonomous decision-making.  Chief of Staff Red 
said that sometimes his minister ‘locked in on a particular bias’, and ‘if you wanted to 
undo it, you had to be careful to take your time’.  Undoing it meant getting contrary 
evidence, as his minister was ‘an evidence-based person’.  While this is not 
unquestioning acceptance of a principle’s preference, it accords with Minister Red’s 
desire that advisers should disagree with him, and also with Adviser Red’s comment 
that he ‘was quite comfortable having the argument again and again, so long as you 
had new arguments’.  It also fits with accounts related in other sections of this paper 
of advisers and ministers debating policy decisions, and with Ministers Blue, Red 
and Green saying sometimes their advisers advocated a better course and they 
changed their position.   
 
In another example, Adviser Green talked about decisions he made on information 
he would provide his minister, saying ‘you never wanted to give bad advice.  You’re 
never going to try to get the minister to make a decision which you think is not the 
right decision ... so you might sort of tailor it to making that decision easier ... you 
probably present it in a way which leaves out stuff which is going to be complicating 
the decision-making process ... unnecessarily’.  This approach complied with his 
minister’s request to, ‘Tell me what I need to know to make the decision I have to 
make’.  It also accords with Chief of Staff Green’s view that if he gave irrelevant 
information to his minister, ‘I know his response would have been, “Why are you 
sending me all this stuff?”’.  On another occasion, Adviser Green talked of putting his 
policy ideas into a speech he drafted for the minister.  He said, ‘So I wrote a speech 
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for him where I just dumped all my sort of philosophical ideas into it, some policy 
drivers into it.  And he read the [draft] speech and just went, “That’s a really good 
idea”’.  While Adviser Green appeared to work independently on policy development, 
all his advice went to the minister through the chief of staff, who said he was 
comfortable with Adviser Green working that way because he and the minister 
‘broadly agreed with where he was going and he wasn’t binding us to anything.’   
 
Senior Adviser Green was the only adviser to say he had issued instructions to 
departments ‘without ... formal sign-off from the minister’.  However, he had been a 
long-term, senior public servant, and ‘I knew where I could go and I knew where I’d 
need to be more formal about it’.  He also felt able to do this because he and his 
minister ‘were so aligned ... that I felt my freedom was not total, but large’.  He also 
described a situation where he ‘made some political calls without any reference to 
[Minister Green]’ at a meeting he organised and chaired between private and public 
sector representatives.  They held opposing views of factual matters, and his 
minister had told him to ‘Sort it’.  While he made those political calls, it is important to 
note he did not make the final decision.  He ‘asked [the public servants] to produce a 
brief within 24 hours that went the way forward that I’d sort of given them’, which his 
minister then agreed to and signed off.  It was also ‘an issue that we’d dabbled in for 
probably six months beforehand ... .  So we’d met with all the stakeholders and with 
[the department] and, you know, briefings that were two inches thick’.  In other 
words, he was operating within a clear framework and knowledge of his minister’s 
views.   
 
The behavioural variations discussed above can also be explained by the advisers’ 
seniority, experience, background, and level of activity in policy processes.  Senior 
Adviser Green was one of the most experienced advisers, having worked for many 
years in public and private sector positions, and had a deep technical knowledge of 
his policy area.  This, combined with his close relationship with his minister and their 
common policy goals, may explain his confidence in making the calls he talked 
about.  However, he said that did not happen ‘very often’.   
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Chief of Staff Red and Adviser Green had both worked in opposition, where advisers 
often have more freedom and influence.110 Senior Adviser Green, while not an 
opposition staffer, came to know his minister in opposition and had assisted him in 
their shared area of policy expertise.  While scant attention has been paid to 
opposition staff and how they make the transition into government, Walter has said 
that in opposition ‘the partisan adviser is in a privileged position as primary source of, 
or conduit to, relevant knowledges [sic]’.111  It is possible that time spent as an 
opposition adviser, in a closer relationship with a shadow minister, and able to wield 
more influence, may have played a part in the confidence these three advisers 
displayed in exercising their delegated authority.  Senior Adviser Green and Adviser 
Green were also both ‘very active’ policy advisers according to Maley’s criteria and 
Chief of Staff Red ‘active’.112  Maley has said that very active advisers ‘can pose 
challenges’ in policy processes by encouraging bureaucrats to be overly 
responsive,113 although in the examples considered that did not occur.     
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates ministers exerted a strong influence which largely defined 
the way advisers behaved.  They set standards and established an office culture, 
creating frameworks for their advisers’ actions.  They also exerted influence though 
the force of their personalities, with advisers modifying their behaviour to suit 
ministers’ preferences and style.  The ways they wanted advisers to behave partly 
reflected ministers’ values.  However, they were also motivated by self-preservation, 
aware that advisers represented them and seeking to avoid needless controversy.   
 
The findings demonstrate that advisers continued to work as their ministers’ agents. 
The clearest evidence of the agency relationship was the consistent understanding 
among advisers of the limits to their decision-making and their acceptance that 
ministers, as elected representatives, made substantive decisions.  That was a 
strong and constant constraint on their behaviour.  The evidence of an agency 
relationship, and the constraints it exerted on behaviour, contrasts with conclusions 
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  Walter (1986), op cit, p 141. 
111
  Walter (1986), op cit, pp 140-141. 
112
  As expected for chiefs of staff who have a number of non-policy responsibilities. 
113
  Maley (2010), op cit, p 110. 
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drawn from controversies like the children overboard affair.  The evidence supports 
the argument that those events present extremes of adviser behaviour, not the norm.   
 
The chapter also explored the delegation of authority from ministers to advisers and 
how varying delegations affected behaviour.  While ministers generally delegated 
broad authority, delegation could vary.  More authority was delegated to senior, more 
experienced advisers, and most ministers expected their chief of staff to supervise 
the activities of other advisers – a clear departure from Maley’s findings where 
advisers usually reported direct to their ministers.114  Strong norms of behaviour were 
apparent about how advisers exercised their delegated authority, and the limits to 
that authority.  Those norms are explored further in the next chapter which considers 
other influences on adviser behaviour.   
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  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 20. 
  41 
Chapter 4 – Other forces shaping advisers’ behaviour  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Ministers exert the dominant influence over advisers’ behaviour, but not the only one.  
Other forces which shape and constrain advisers’ behaviour are examined in this 
chapter: advisers’ relationships with the public service, their personal conceptions 
and preferences, and the effect of the Code of Conduct for Ministerial Advisers 
introduced in July 2008.  Reflecting Dunn’s findings,115 several participants referred 
to informal accountability mechanisms, and these are also examined.  As in the 
previous chapter, strong norms of behaviour were evident.   
 
The need to maintain a productive working relationship with the public service clearly 
influenced adviser behaviour.  In some respects, this relates to ministers’ influence 
and their desire for that relationship to be a positive one.  However, advisers also 
reported their own preference for sound relationships.  On top of this, the public 
service acted as a check on adviser behaviour in its own right, particularly with junior 
advisers.  Public servants questioned advisers’ authority and sometimes reported 
excesses to chiefs of staff or ministers.  Advisers are said to use their power to bully 
public servants,116 but participants provided examples of public servants pushing 
back, sometimes robustly, reflecting Maley’s findings.117   
 
Advisers’ personal conceptions also had an effect.  Values of professionalism and 
integrity underpinned their behaviour, as did the need to maintain a positive 
reputation among colleagues to be able to work effectively.  The Code of Conduct 
was the final factor investigated.  Most advisers believed it did not have a large 
impact because they were already meeting its standards.  Still, many thought its 
existence important, and it may have added to the culture of restraint apparent from 
these interviews. 
 
                                                   
115
  Dunn (1997), op cit, p 103.   
116
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, pp 235 and 246.   
117
  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 275 
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2. Advisers’ relationship with the public service 
 
One of an adviser’s principal relationships is with the bureaucracy.  Examining that 
relationship demonstrates its influence and provides insights into the way advisers 
behave.  While all advisers worked closely with their minister’s departments, the 
interviews confirmed Maley’s findings that the relationship is a contested one, with 
advisers working hard to make it function well.118  Chief of Staff Red’s comment that 
‘We tried to cultivate a very good relationship with the department.  We would be 
very open with them’, was typical of most.  Adviser Red also wanted a ‘good working 
relationship with the department’ which she achieved through acknowledging ‘you 
need to be respectful a bit, understand what the public servant’s role in it is, and be 
respectful of what you can and can’t ask them to do’.   
 
Giving a hint of the contest in the relationship, Chief of Staff Green said that as 
‘active agents of our minister ... we may differ and we may take different approaches 
to things’.  Minister Orange was clearer when he recalled, ‘I encouraged all my staff 
to stand their ground if they thought that the bureaucrats were trying to stifle our 
direction or our aims without good reason’.  However, he also thought, ‘You can’t be 
fighting with the department day and night’, and that the ‘most junior staff..., some of 
them don’t have the experience to make that call’.  He expected those advisers to 
talk to the chief of staff first.   
 
Advisers sought collaborative, productive relationships with public servants because 
otherwise their jobs were more difficult and results less likely.  Adviser Green said he 
worked ‘constructively’ with the public service.  He ‘wanted to listen to them ... and 
establish a sort of mutually respectful and robust sort of space to operate in’.  He 
knew he couldn’t burn bridges, ‘otherwise you won’t get the end result’ and, ‘you 
were going to need them at some other stage’.  Chief of Staff Orange confirmed that 
a good relationship improved outcomes saying, ‘you need to have a good working 
relationship ... because it makes work better.  It would be dreadful if everyday you’re 
just fighting with everybody.  And I do believe you get a better result if you ... try to 
do it together’.  Similarly Adviser Orange said she ‘had some very good people ... 
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  Maley (2002), op cit, pp 142-143.  
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who gave me very good advice’.  Some public servants gave her ‘inside information’, 
pointing to ‘blockages’ she needed sort out.  Other advisers sought competent 
bureaucrats to work closely with.  Chief of Staff Blue said ‘we would bring people 
close to us, in a professional and respectful manner, who we thought were good’.  
Likewise, Senior Adviser Green said ‘you’d pick and choose who you’d [talk to].  So 
when you found a good person you’d really go for it’.   
 
Although it is said advisers are in a strong position to influence ministers against the 
bureaucracy,119  advisers themselves said they would sometimes argue on behalf of 
departments to ministers.  All advisers would speak in favour of public servants, to 
put problems in perspective and ensure the relationship between the minister and 
the department remained healthy.  Adviser Blue said she would do this ‘quite a lot, 
really’.  She was ‘not making excuses, but trying to explain what the context was’.  
Chief of Staff Orange, describing advisers as ‘the meat in the middle’, said she would 
advocate for the department ‘all the time’ if her minister’s expectations were 
unrealistic.  She did so ‘because it was the truth’ but also because ‘I don’t want him 
to think that they’re hopeless if they’re not ... because it will affect the working 
relationship he has with the department.  And it’s in everybody’s interest that it’s 
good’.  Similarly Adviser Red saw ‘part of my role as making sure both sides 
understood what the other was doing’.   
 
On the other hand, advisers would criticise the behaviour or competence of 
departments when they had to explain why deadlines were missed, or work was not 
of acceptable standard.  Chief of Staff Orange represented a typical approach, 
saying she would do this, ‘all the time, when it was justified’.  However, she would 
not initiate the discussion without cause. ‘I wouldn’t just go in ... and whinge about it’, 
she said, ‘It was because [Minister Orange] would be frustrated because they hadn’t 
done something.  Or because they had done something the wrong way’.  Restraint 
was exercised to maintain a good relationship between the minister and the 
department, but also because ministers were busy.  Chief of Staff Red said, ‘you 
don’t bother ministers unless you have to bother ministers.  I didn’t want to tell him 
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  Eichbaum and Shaw (2007a), op cit, pp 624-627, especially p 625-626 where some public 
servant survey participants suggest ‘that an adviser’s personal assessment of the calibre of 
officials can, if communicated to the minister sotto voce, significantly influence the latter’s 
perception of the quality of advice’; also Eichbaum and Shaw (2006), op cit, p 12.    
  44 
about transactions with individuals.  But sometimes, where they are individuals who 
are repeat offenders, you do have to tell him what’s going on so that he can actually, 
at a strategic point, just lob in a grenade to get the relationship back in the right 
place.  But you don’t want to do a blow by blow.  There’s not enough time to do that’.   
 
Advisers would contest policy advice from the public service.  Chief of Staff Green 
would sometimes say, ‘“This may not be the best thing to do right now”, through to, 
“Interesting contribution, but it’s suicidal”’.  He said differences arose because public 
servants ‘don’t have the same series of lenses that we were asked to apply’.  Senior 
Adviser Green would also challenge the department’s advice as it ‘would take sort of 
an academic view rather than a street-smart view.  And so you’d sort of say, “Well, 
yeah, that’s really good advice but it’s a shame we live in the real world”’.   
 
Chief of Staff Blue sometimes thought his minister needed to understand the 
character of a particular public servant.  This usually related to whether he thought 
the public servant could be trusted to act competently or keep confidences.  He said, 
‘there were issues of trust in a couple of matters and I said to [Minister Blue], “This 
person, I don’t trust and ... it’s been proven by the fact they have done this, this, and 
this”’.  This comment was made in the context of concern over getting correct 
information from an agency, an important consideration if the minister was not to 
inadvertently mislead parliament or make incorrect public statements.  Chief of Staff 
Blue would caution his minister, saying, ‘I’m not sure we are getting the right 
information and we really need to be careful with this’.  He added that he and his 
minister ‘would have very frank conversations about our views about different 
people.  Some people were very good and very trustworthy.  Some we thought were 
very slippery and some were just incompetent’.  This approach seems to be a 
corollary to the comments reported earlier that advisers sought out competent public 
servants.   
 
The public service could directly constrain advisers’ behaviour.  Two examples were 
reported: where public servants refused to accept an adviser’s authority, and when 
they reported transgressions to chiefs of staff or ministers.  Adviser Orange found 
some public servants ‘quite dismissive of advisers’, and had her role ‘questioned on 
a couple of occasions’.  In one of the examples she gave, she had requested 
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additional feedback be sought from stakeholders, but a public servant refused until 
her minister sent an email confirming the request.  She found that conflict ‘draining’ 
and ‘uncomfortable’.  Chief of Staff Green found that agencies with less interaction 
with advisers and ministers, lacked confidence advisers were speaking on behalf of 
the minister and were less likely to accept their authority.  He said that several times, 
‘a senior person from [agency X] would have said ... “No, that’s not your call.  I want 
to speak to the minister about it”’.  He thought there ‘was just a difference in 
confidence level between someone from [agency X] and someone from [the main 
portfolio department] that there was internal communication in our office’.  While 
other advisers did not report such direct conflicts, public service attitudes could still 
constrain their behaviour.  As Adviser Blue said, ‘The other thing is, with public 
servants, it’s not that they don’t respect you, but they know that the minister is their 
boss, not you.  And so unless you say, “Well, look, this is what the minister wants”, ... 
they’re not going to do it on your say so’.   
 
Some participants reported instances where public servants talked to the minister or 
the chief of staff where they thought an adviser had transgressed acceptable 
standards.  Minister Blue said that bureaucrats occasionally raised concerns with 
him in ‘a corner conversation’ if ‘they thought a staff member was going too far on 
some particular issue’.  That usually involved ‘excessive impoliteness, or it would 
involve demands for changes of policy that hadn’t been agreed, hadn’t been part of 
the [negotiating] framework’.  However, he added that while ‘there were moments 
when bureaucrats thought, “These people are going a bit too far”.  ... I’m sure there 
were fewer moments when they were in fact doing so’.  Chief of Staff Green had 
similar experiences saying, ‘I might get a phone call from the department saying, you 
know, “Just had a conversation with X adviser.  Kind of think it went a little bad”’.  
During staff meetings he would remind advisers of the standards expected, but ‘not 
immediately after so that person felt called out, but sometime thereafter we’d do a 
refresh on, you know, just those behavioural expectations and respect and all of 
those kind of things’.   
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3. Personal motivations and conceptions  
 
Adviser behaviour was also influenced by strong, pre-existing personal motivations 
and ideals unrelated to a minister’s influence.  One motivation was the need to 
protect their own reputation.  Chief of Staff Orange thought reputation important 
because advisers, to successfully do their job, had to be perceived by colleagues as 
reliable and worth talking to.  She said it, ‘comes down to personal reputation ... if 
you’ve dealt with someone before and they’ve [overstepped their authority] with you, 
you’re going to be much more wary about doing it again’.  She thought being able to 
fulfil commitments was important, saying ‘if you do have a discussion with another 
office where you commit your portfolio and your office ... and they [ministers] don’t 
like it, well you look like an idiot because you have to go back to the people to say, 
“No. Sorry.  Even though I said we can do it, well we can’t”.  So, maybe that’s what 
constrains you’.  Similarly, Minister Blue observed there was ‘a lot of peer pressure’.  
This reflects Maley’s finding that trust between advisers was important, and that 
created informal rules of behaviour, one of which was ‘doing what you agreed to 
do’.120   
 
Pointing to an ideal that influenced behaviour, Chief of Staff Orange also thought not 
being able to fulfil commitments was ‘unprofessional’, going on to emphasise ‘I 
guess part of it is being professional, like full stop professional’.  Chief of Staff Blue 
said an influence on his behaviour was ‘just being aware of your own integrity’.  
Adviser Red thought she ‘had an obligation to act with integrity and to serve [Minister 
Red’s] interest’.  But she also thought ‘the driving factor ... would more have been my 
own desire to operate that way’.   
 
4. Code of Conduct  
 
The Code of Conduct for Ministerial Staff implemented recommendations of Senate 
committee inquiries arising out of the children overboard affair, filling one of the gaps 
in the accountability framework that has been identified.121  All advisers except one 
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  Maley (2011), op cit, pp 1479 and 1481.   
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  Recommendation 11 of the Senate Select Committee Into A Certain Maritime Incident 
October 2002 Report, and recommendation 9 of the Senate Finance and Public 
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were aware of the Code.  The lone adviser was a public servant who thought this 
was probably because its obligations would have been similar to those applied to 
public servants.  None of the other advisers thought the Code had changed their 
behaviour, largely because they already applied its standards, although most 
supported its introduction.  A typical comment came from Chief of Staff Orange, who 
thought ‘there was nothing in there that was different to what I thought was the way 
to behave’.  Chief of Staff Red did not think it ‘strengthened the defences against 
corrupt or inappropriate behaviour’, something that depended on having ‘good 
people with good common sense [who] understand where the ethical boundaries 
are’.  However, he thought it was ‘a useful thing to read and just to refresh people 
about the way they should approach their dealings with others’.  Adviser Orange had 
the highest awareness among the junior advisers.  She had read the Code and kept 
it on her desk, but said ‘all the principles were fairly common standards to me’.   
 
Chief of Staff Green said the Code had not ‘changed anything for us’ because he 
had already ‘laid down a code of conduct in the office that went to behaviours, that 
went to probity, that went to most of the things that are laid down in that Code of 
Conduct’.  However, when the Code was introduced, he wrote to each member of 
staff and ‘had them sign a document saying they’d received it, that they 
acknowledged the terms of it ... I don’t even know about the legal veracity of this, but 
that it was effectively part of their terms and conditions to work in [Minister Green’s] 
environment’.  He strongly supported a code, saying if it ‘adds the reality or even the 
impression or the implication of the growing numbers of political staff behaving in a 
way that’s appropriate, then good’.  Two ministers were aware of the Code, and 
another also supported it when made aware of it.  However, Minister Red’s view was 
‘relatively cynical’.  He thought ‘basically, the code of conduct is how your minister 
behaves’.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
Administration References Committee’s October 2003 report on its Inquiry into Staff 
Employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984.   
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5. Informal accountability  
 
Some participants noted that there were checks and balances on behaviour, which 
were strengthened by the ease with which advisers could lose their jobs.  They 
suggested this was a system of informal accountability.  Chief of Staff Orange 
thought lack of job security played a part in constraining behaviour, saying ‘part of 
that is ... immediate termination, the precarious nature of your actual employment’.  
Chief of Staff Blue said ‘there are too many checks and balances for ministerial staff 
to be totally out of control’, giving the example of sacking an adviser.  He said, ‘for 
example, that guy that I got rid of, I got rid of because I decided he was bad.  But if, 
say, I was really out of control in some way, the prime ministers’ office would have 
told the minister to get rid of me.  Or there would be a media outcry about something 
I had done and I would be dumped because of that’.  Chief of Staff Orange said ‘I 
guess you behave as if you are completely accountable for everything you do 
anyway’, because ‘you can get called on everything, all the time.  So, you’re 
constantly accountable.  But just unofficially’.  She thought the maintenance of 
personal reputation discussed in the previous section was part of the informal 
accountability because ‘if the prime minister’s office thinks that you’re a dick and you 
can’t do anything, then you won’t be able to get anything done’.  Maintaining the 
minister’s trust was part of it too, but she said, ‘It’s not just if your minister doesn’t 
trust you. ... If nobody wants to work with you, then you’re stuffed.  So you’re 
accountable all the time to everybody’.  Those comments reflect Dunn’s conclusion 
that adviser ‘discretion’ was tempered by internal and external controls.122   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented evidence about the forces that operate alongside 
ministerial influence to shape advisers’ behaviour.  Advisers’ need to maintain a 
productive working relationship with the public service was one factor, as was their 
preference for a harmonious relationship.  The public service also constrained 
behaviour by questioning advisers’ authority and reporting transgressions to chiefs of 
staff or ministers.  Advisers had strong, personal ideals about professionalism and 
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integrity which, along with the need to maintain the respect and confidence of their 
colleagues, also shaped their behaviour.  While most advisers were aware of the 
Code of Conduct, they reported it had not changed their behaviour, but  most also 
supported its introduction.  Participants also commented that a system of informal 
accountability operated, reinforced by the ease with which advisers can lose both 
their credibility and their job.   
 
As in the preceding chapter, strong norms of behaviour emerged.  Those norms 
make claims that advisers are operating in a ‘black hole of accountability’123 seem 
exaggerated.  In fact it was striking, even disappointing, that very few variations in 
behaviour were evident, both between individual advisers and advisers working in 
the different minister’s offices.  The strong norms lend weight to the idea, explored in 
the conclusion, that after 40 years of advisers operating within Australian 
governments, a professional ministerial adviser has emerged as the dominant type, 
at the expense of others identified by Maley.124    
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public servants’ and ‘policy experts’; Maley (2002b), op cit, pp 296-300. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion  
 
A hypothesis that ministers exert a dominant influence over the behaviour of their 
advisers prompted this study and was supported by its findings.  Advisers continued 
to operate as agents of their ministers, and ministers said they would take 
responsibility for advisers’ actions unless they acted comprehensively outside their 
delegated authority.  Because ministers accepted that responsibility, they 
established standards and set expectations about advisers’ behaviour.  This was 
partly for self-interest, as they sought to avoid controversy or bolster themselves 
against damaging actions of public servants in a dysfunctional relationship with 
advisers.  Chiefs of staff assisted ministers to control adviser behaviour.  They 
supervised other advisers, paying particular attention to those with less experience, 
and issued reminders about the standards advisers were expected to meet.  This 
differed from Maley’s study, where advisers typically reported direct to ministers,125 
and suggests a recent institutional change.   
 
There was also evidence of ministers indirectly affecting the behaviour of advisers.  
Advisers moderated their own behaviour, even outside work, conscious their actions 
reflected on the reputation of their minister, and striving to avoid controversy.  Some 
advisers worked in ways they did not personally prefer, adapting themselves to the 
preferences of their minister.  It was clear that, within the small organisation that is a 
minister’s office, minister’s preferences and values were readily absorbed by 
advisers and reflected in how they conducted themselves.    
 
While the minister’s influence was dominant, there were other influences as well.  
Advisers’ relationships with the public service operated as a major constraint on 
behaviour.  Advisers relied on public servants to fulfil their responsibilities, so had to 
maintain productive relationships with them.  Public servants also, on occasion, 
challenged the authority of advisers and reported excessive behaviour, and the mere 
possibility of that occurring also exerted a constraining influence.  Advisers’ pre-
existing, personal ideals of professionalism and integrity influenced behaviour, as did 
the need to protect personal reputation by being able to fulfil commitments.  Advisers 
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said the Code of Conduct had not changed their behaviour as they were already 
meeting its standards.  However, many would refer to it from time to time, and 
thought its existence important.   
 
It was striking that strong norms of behaviour emerged, despite ministers being 
chosen for this study for their diverse characteristics.  This differs to some extent 
from Maley’s findings of significant variations in advisers’ levels of policy activity, 
caused partly by their minister’s characteristics and partly by their own policy skills 
and role conception.126  However, Maley was focussing on advisers’ roles and 
functions.127  This study focussed on behaviour itself, and found norms of behaviour 
that transcend functions and roles.  Indeed, Maley did find some ‘unwritten rules of 
appropriate behaviour’ among advisers about how they dealt with each other.  In her 
study, Keating government advisers thought it important to maintain amicable 
relationships with other advisers, keep relationships between advisers functioning, 
especially when ministers were in conflict, be ‘straight’ in policy negotiations, and 
take a whole of government perspective.128  Dunn found similar conventions, along 
with others that reflect those found in this study related to ministers’ decision-making 
responsibilities, the exercise of discretion by advisers, and the work that can be 
appropriately requested of departments.129  The findings of this study support a 
conclusion that advisers have a consistent understanding of expected norms of 
behaviour, unaffected by different portfolios or the dynamics of different policy 
processes.   
 
It was also clear that advisers worked within a system of checks and balances, 
reflecting Dunn’s findings.130  Advisers frequently mentioned the ease with which 
wrongdoing, bad judgement and inefficiency could come to the attention of other 
advisers, chiefs of staff, ministers, or the prime minister’s office.  Bad judgement 
could damage an advisers’ reputation among other advisers, and erode ministers’ 
trust.  Minister Orange articulated a common view when he described trust as ‘at the 
heart of the minister – staffer relationship’.  If advisers’ actions damaged that trust, it 
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was difficult for them to continue in their role.  The ease with which they could be 
dismissed was a further discipline.  Judging from the responses about the impact of 
the Code of Conduct, it seems those informal elements had a stronger effect than 
the Code and its procedures for breaches.   
 
Several differences from the findings of earlier studies are apparent.  One change 
was the emergence of a management structure within ministers’ offices, with three of 
the chiefs of staff checking advisers’ work before it was provided to the minister, 
providing guidance and advice, and reminding advisers about standards of 
behaviour.131  This contrasts with Maley’s findings that most advisers reported direct 
to ministers.132   
 
The second difference was the finding that advisers acted as agents of their 
ministers.  While this reflected earlier studies,133 it differed from Tiernan’s conclusions  
that advisers were ‘out of control’ and acting independently.134  The Code of 
Conduct’s explicit ban on advisers directing public servants and making executive 
decisions may have encouraged the return to an agency relationship which 
appeared to have fallen down during the children overboard affair.  This departure 
from Tiernan’s findings supports the argument that the circumstances surrounding 
the children overboard affair were exceptional rather than the norm.   
 
The backgrounds of the advisers revealed one of the most striking changes from 
those in Maley’s study – the dominance of the long-term, professional adviser.  Most 
had served a number of ministers in a variety of portfolios, sometimes in different 
jurisdictions, working as advisers for a number of years.  All were partisan, unlike 
previous studies.135  Maley identified four adviser types.136  Twenty-two per cent were 
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‘political warriors’ with responsibility for party political work.  ‘Partisan public 
servants’, 32.5 per cent, were also party members.  ‘Policy experts’ had been 
recruited for their expertise, with 51 per cent specialists.137  Her ‘long term or 
professional’ adviser, 37 per cent of her sample, had worked for ministers for four or 
more years.  If that definition is applied to the advisers in this study, then seven 
advisers (78 per cent) were professional advisers.  If time spent in opposition is 
added, that figure rises to eight advisers (88 per cent).  Those long-term professional 
advisers had generalist policy skills rather than specialist knowledge, and an 
understanding of government and the bureaucracy.  The emergence of the ‘long-
term professional adviser’ as the dominant type may have also contributed to the 
strength of the norms of behaviour revealed in this study.  This finding stands in 
sharp contrast with claims frequently made in non-scholarly debate that most 
advisers are young and inexperienced.138   
 
The work and behaviour of advisers remains an under-researched area.  Further 
research on adviser behaviour is warranted, including with public servants and those 
working for stakeholder organisations and interest groups.  There is very little 
research on advisers’ roles in opposition, how they make the transition into 
government, and how they act once they are there.  This is worth pursuing given the 
findings that those advisers who worked in opposition tended to be the most active 
and independent in government.  Finally, it is striking that most major controversies 
involving advisers in Australia have occurred in the lead up to elections or toward the 
end of a government’s term – perhaps as ministers and advisers become more 
reckless or determined to remain in government.139  There is little research on the 
                                                                                                                                                              
with 13 per cent of Fraser government staffers, and 72 per cent of advisers in the Hawke 
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with the minister signing inadequate documents in January 1993 when a federal election was 
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differences between advisers in governments at the start of their term and at the 
end.  Although some inferences can be made from studies conducted at different 
stages of different governments, this would be interesting to pursue, particularly 
given the anecdotal observations of participants in this study about the tendency of 
some late-term governments to resort to less experienced advisers.   
  
The findings support the argument that controversies represent the extremes of 
adviser behaviour and should not be the sole data considered in the accountability 
debate.  They do not support the frequent claims that advisers operate in an 
accountability ‘black hole’.  Strong norms of behaviour were apparent, with advisers 
clearly acting as ministers’ agents, and there were many checks and balances 
operating to constrain their behaviour.  The findings provide an insight into the way 
policy advisers carry out their day-to-day work, giving a more detailed picture on 
which to base the accountability debate.  Maley has argued that the best way to 
boost accountability is to strengthen the agency relationship between ministers and 
their advisers.140  This study shows that has happened, at least in the Rudd 
government.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
expected to be called ‘any day’, although it was timing pressure rather than a quest for 
electoral advantage that contributed to the failings: Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 81.The ‘travel 
rorts’ controversy arose partly from ministers having claimed travel allowances during the 
1996 election campaign, breaking a convention; ibid, p188.  The events associated with the 
children overboard controversy occurred during the 2001 election campaign: Senate Select 
Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, (2002), op cit, p xxi.   
140
  Maley (2003), op cit, p 2. 
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Appendix 1 
Background of advisersa 
 Total 
Party membersb 8 
Public service experiencec 5 
Private sector experience 7 
Worked in opposition 3 
Worked in more than one jurisdiction 4 
Worked for more than one ministerd 7 
Worked for more than two ministerse  3 
Worked in more than one portfoliof 7 
Adviser for longer than four yearsg  7 
Law degree 7 
Economics degree 3 
Postgraduate degree 3 
Female 4 
Male 5 
 
a  n=9 
b defined as those who had been a member at any stage before, during or after their employment 
as an adviser 
c defined as anyone who had ever worked in the public service, not just those who had a right of 
return to a public service position 
d includes work for state ministers and, in one case, for the prime minister 
e includes work for state ministers 
f not including shadow portfolios 
g Maley’s ‘long-term professional adviser’ had worked as an adviser in government for more than 
four years.  This figure does not include time spent working for opposition shadow ministers. 
 
Nine advisers were interviewed.  Four were chiefs of staff, one to a cabinet minister 
and three to junior ministers.  Four more were policy advisers.  The ninth, Senior 
Adviser Green, had worked as a senior adviser and then as a chief of staff.  The two 
youngest were in their late twenties and the oldest just over 60.  Four were in their 
forties and two in their thirties.  Five were male and four female.  Three of the chiefs 
of staff were male and one female.   
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Seven advisers nominated policy interest as the primary reason they became 
advisers.  The other two were both public service policy officers looking for a career 
change and, in one case, career advancement, and both had a strong interest in 
policy development.  Out of the other seven, one also nominated an interest in 
politics, and another had political ambitions and saw being an adviser as an 
apprenticeship.  Some saw adviser positions as providing more scope to influence 
policy than public sector positions.  Five advisers were ‘active’ in policy processes 
using Maley’s typology, and four were ‘very active’.141  None were classified ‘passive/ 
reactive’.  With some responsibilities not related to policy, all chiefs of staff were 
classified as active.  The nature of one policy area, which required some reactive 
work, made one adviser ‘active’ rather than ‘very active’. 
 
Five advisers (55 per cent) had prior policy experience, all having worked in the 
public service.  This was similar to the Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke administrations 
where around half had public sector experience, but lower than the Keating 
government (70 per cent).142  Three who had worked in the public service had also 
worked for consultancy firms.  Another had worked in other private sector 
organisations.   
 
Of the four who had not worked in the public service, two were lawyers, one had a 
science background, and one came from an electorate office.  One of the lawyers 
had also worked in a non-government organisation. Three advisers had worked in 
opposition, two for their ministers.  Another, the only adviser with specialist subject-
area expertise, had worked with his minister on policy when Labor was in opposition 
but that was part of his lobbying work as a consultant.  All others had general policy 
skills, some on commencement, and others through experience on-the-job.  This 
contrasts with the Whitlam government, where only around 30 advisers out of a total 
of 161 had policy-type skills.143   
                                                   
141
  Maley (2000), op cit, pp 454-468; Maley (2002b), op cit, pp 101-102 and 166-202.  Senior 
Adviser Green has been included in this category.  As a subject expert in a senior adviser role 
he was very active.  When he held the chief of staff role he said he was active.   
142
  Walter (1986), op cit, p120; Maley (2002b), op cit, p 291-292. 
143  Forward reported that in November 1974, a total of 227 staff were employed in the 27 
ministers offices in the Whitlam Government.  Of those, 161 were private secretaries, 
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All had worked in a number of different portfolios.   
 
Eight advisers were still, or had been, members of the Australian Labor Party.  The 
other described himself as ‘very aligned’.144  One of the advisers from the public 
service was not a member but had ‘some affinity with that side of politics’, and joined 
afterwards. 
 
Six of the nine advisers had law degrees, and another had a graduate diploma in 
public law along with a bachelor degree in business studies.  One had a science 
degree and one, Senior Adviser Green, had no tertiary qualifications.  He was the 
oldest of the group, and also the only subject-area expert.  Three held master 
degrees in law, and one of those three also had a master degree in international 
relations.   
 
A distinct change on this study from previous studies was in the advisory careers of 
the adviser-participants.  Generally, they had worked for more ministers, in more 
portfolios, and for a greater length of time than advisers in earlier Australian 
governments.  Four of the advisers had worked for state government ministers as 
well as federal.  Seven (77.7 per cent) had worked for more than one minister, if 
state government service is counted.  Two chiefs of staff had worked for five 
ministers each and another for three.  This contrasts with Maley’s study were the 
majority (58.5 per cent) had worked for only one minister, only five per cent had 
worked for four ministers (two advisers) and no one had worked for more than four.145  
In this study, the longest length of service was ten years, followed by nine.  The 
shortest was two and a half years, although that adviser had served the same 
amount of time in opposition.  The average length of government service was five 
and a half years.  The three advisers who had worked in opposition had served from 
two and a half to four years.  In Maley’s study, 51 per cent had worked as an adviser 
for two years or less,146 whereas in this study there were none.   
                                                                                                                                                              
assistant private secretaries, press secretaries and similar; Forward (1977), op cit, p 160.  
Smith says around 30 had policy skills; Smith, op cit, pp 299-300.   
144  As well as a philosophical alignment, he handed out how-to-vote cards for the Australian 
Labor Party.     
145  Maley (2002b), op cit, p 291.   
146  Ibid, p 291.  Although in Maley’s study, two advisers out of 41 had worked for 10 years as 
advisers. 
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Time spent working as an adviser a 
Average not including opposition 5.5 years 
Average including opposition 6.6 years  
Longest  10 years 
Shortestb  2.5 years 
a (n=9)   
b not including time spent as an opposition adviser 
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Appendix 2 
The Children Overboard Affair 
 
In the children overboard affair as it is commonly known, it was alleged that on 7 
October 2001 a number of children were thrown into the sea after a boat carrying 
asylum seekers had been intercepted by the Australian Defence Force the evening 
before.  Also on 7 October, the then Minister for Immigration held a media 
conference condemning the action.  The next day the story received wide media 
coverage and a federal election was called.   
 
While it became apparent during the following few days that this account was wrong, 
the record was not corrected until after the election on 10 November.  In fact, the 
story was repeated by senior government ministers and the prime minister during a 
campaign in which border control and security featured heavily.147  They claimed their 
advisers had not told them of the inaccuracy.148  The ministers involved refused to 
testify before the Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident 
established to inquire into the events, and refused to allow their advisers to 
appear.149  Later, one of those advisers testified to a special Senate inquiry that he 
had in fact briefed ministers about the errors.  Those events helped confirm 
suspicions that ministers had lied, and were hiding behind the inability of Senate 
committees to compel their advisers to appear.150  
 
The Committee found a number of factors contributed to the inaccurate report, 
including ‘genuine miscommunication or misunderstanding, inattention, avoidance of 
responsibility, a public service culture of responsiveness and perhaps over-
responsiveness to the political needs of ministers, and deliberate deception 
motivated by political expedience’.  Among many the findings on the conduct and 
shortcomings of ministers, the public service and ministerial advisers, the Committee 
noted ‘the tendency of ministerial staff to act as quasi-ministers in their own right, 
                                                   
147
  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, (2002), op cit, pp xxi-xl. 
148
  Tiernan (2004), op cit, p 234.   
149
  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, (2002), op cit, pp xxi-xl.  
150
  Maley (2010), op cit, p 108.   
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and the lack of adequate mechanisms to render them publicly accountable for their 
actions’.  The Committee went on to say there was ‘a serious accountability vacuum 
at the level of ministers’ offices’ which ‘appears to be a function partly of the 
increased size of ministers’ staff, but more significantly of the evolution of the role of 
advisers to a point where they appear to enjoy a level of autonomous executive 
authority separable from that to which they have been customarily entitled as the 
immediate agents of the minister’.  The Committee added, ‘It is no longer the case 
that advisers’ accountabilities are adequately rendered via ministers’ accountability 
to parliament because it can no longer be assumed that advisers act at the express 
direction of ministers and /or with their knowledge and consent. Increasingly, 
advisers are wielding executive power in their own right’.151   
 
  
                                                   
151
  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, (2002), op cit, pp xxi-xl.   
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Appendix 3 
The Code of Conduct for Ministerial Staff 
 
The Code of Conduct for Ministerial Staff, introduced in July 2008 by the Rudd 
government, implemented recommendation 9 of a Senate committee inquiry into 
‘Staff Employed Under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984’.152  That inquiry 
was established following a recommendation of the Senate Select Committee on a 
Certain Maritime Incident.153  
 
Among the Code’s 21 clauses are requirements that staff acknowledge they do not 
have the power to direct public servants, and that executive decisions are for 
ministers and public servants to make, not ministerial staff acting in their own right.154  
Sanctions for breaches can be imposed by the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, after 
consulting with the relevant minister, and acting on advice from the Government 
Staffing Committee which consists of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Special Minister 
of State, and that same Chief of Staff.155    
 
The Senate committee that recommended the Code also supported Maley’s 
suggestion given in evidence that the agency relationship between ministers and 
their advisers be reasserted, saying the Code’s ‘central aim’ should be to ensure 
‘ministers take responsibility for the actions of their staff’.156  It also recommended 
ministerial staff should appear before parliamentary committees in limited 
circumstances, including where a minister does not accept responsibility for their 
actions or refuses to answer questions about their conduct.157  Maley says the Rudd 
Government agreed its advisers would appear before parliamentary committees if 
their minister refused to take responsibility for their conduct, but no primary sources 
                                                   
152
  Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee, (2003), Report of the 
Inquiry into Staff Employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, October, 
Parliament of Australia, Canberra, p xxi.   
153
  Ibid, p xi.   
154
  Australian Public Service Commission, (2008), Circular 2008/7: Code of Conduct for 
Ministerial Staff, http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-circulars-and-
advices/2008/circular-20087.    
155
  Maley (2010), op cit, p 109.   
156
  Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee, 2003 op cit, p 61.   
157
  ibid, p xix.   
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confirming this have been found.158  However, after the Code was introduced, the 
then Special Minister of State said the Code made it clear advisers could not issue 
executive directions because they could not be called before committees, unlike 
ministers or public servants.159    
                                                   
158
  Maley (2010), op cit, p 109.   
159
  Faulkner (2008), Ministerial Statement – Restoring Integrity to Government, Senate, 4 
December 2008. 
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Appendix 4 
Interviews 
 
Minister Blue, interviewed 15 August 2012 
Chief of Staff Blue, interviewed by phone, 18 August 2012 
Adviser Blue, interviewed 1 September 2012 
Minister Red, interviewed 13 September 2012 
Chief of Staff Red, interviewed 21 September 2012 
Adviser Red, interviewed 14 September 2012 
Minister Green, interviewed 11 October 2012 
Chief of Staff Green, interviewed 18 September 2012 
Senior Adviser Green, interviewed 20 September 2012 
Adviser Green, interviewed 9 September 2012 
Minister Orange, interviewed by phone, 17 September 2012 
Chief of Staff Orange, interviewed 24 August 2012 
Adviser Orange, interviewed 23 August 2012  
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